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Abstract 
This paper is one of the first attempts to systematically analyze the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic states. It takes the comprehensive 
approach to this issue, extending the research focus beyond the formal scrutiny powers of the 
parliaments and European Affairs Committees to also include informal rules, practices, 
parliamentary traditions and actual scrutiny-related behavior of these bodies. This paper 
concludes that the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is strongest in Lithuania, 
weakest in Latvia, with Estonia being located in the middle of the two. This paper also 
proposes a new independent variable – democratic regime type to explain the variation of the 
strength of parliamentary scrutiny measures among the Baltic states and, possibly, in the 
larger regional context as well.  
  
4 
 
Acknowledgments  
There are many people I would like to thank for their help and assistance, which had made 
this MA thesis possible. First, I would like to thank my family- my parents and my wife for 
all their moral support and putting up with my hectic and erratic work schedule. Second, I 
would like to thank my supervisor- Vello Pettai for his countless advice and for constant push 
to make this paper better. Third, I would like to thank my friend Žaneta Poluvalova, who 
helped me a lot with the data collection. Forth, Thomas Winzen- for his time, consideration 
and consultation. Finally, I would like to thank University of Tartu teaching staff, namely 
Piret Ehin, Mihkel Solvak, Stefano Braghiroli and Heiko Pääbo for their advice and nudges in 
the right direction. 
 
 
  
5 
 
Table	of	Contents	
Index of Tables and Figures ................................................................................................... 7 
Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... 7 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 9 
Chapter 1- Overview of the previous research ..................................................................... 13 
Conceptualization of the dependent variable- strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs ....................................................................................................... 13 
Operationalization ............................................................................................................ 18 
Independent variables ....................................................................................................... 20 
Chapter 2- Methodology ...................................................................................................... 23 
Conceptualization ............................................................................................................. 23 
Operationalization ............................................................................................................ 26 
Formal institutional setup ................................................................................................. 34 
Country score ................................................................................................................... 35 
Dimension evaluation ....................................................................................................... 35 
Calculating the country scores ......................................................................................... 35 
Summary .......................................................................................................................... 36 
Data collection .................................................................................................................. 36 
Chapter 3- Empirical data .................................................................................................... 37 
Formal Institutional Setup ................................................................................................ 37 
“The most important” group ............................................................................................ 38 
“Important” group ............................................................................................................ 45 
Instrumental group ........................................................................................................... 53 
Final country scores ......................................................................................................... 58 
Chapter 4- Model robustness ................................................................................................ 61 
Chapter 5- Explaining the variation ..................................................................................... 66 
Public Euroskepticism ...................................................................................................... 66 
Party Euroskepticism ........................................................................................................ 67 
6 
 
General power of the parliament ...................................................................................... 68 
Semi-presidentialism ........................................................................................................ 69 
Semi-presidentialism- explaining the variation in broader region ................................... 71 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 73 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 76 
 
  
7 
 
Index	of	Tables	and	Figures	
Table 1: “The most important” group scores………………………………………….38 
Table 2: “The most important” group……………….………………………………...39 
Table 3: “Important” group country scores…………………………………………….45 
Table 4: “Important” group………………………………………………………….…46 
Table 5: Instrumental group country scores…………………………………….….….53 
Table 6: Instrumental group…………………………………………………….…......54 
Table 7: Comparison of country results…………………………………….………....61 
Table 8: Standardized country score comparison…………………………….……….63 
Table 9: Share of Euroenthusiasts in the Baltic states and EU 27….………………...67 
Table 10: Dependent variable country scores and general power of the parliament….69 
Table 11: Semi-Presidentialism and strength of parliamentary scrutiny ……………..71 
Figure 1: Graphic comparison of country scores……………………………………...63 
 
Abbreviations	
CEE- Central and Eastern Europe 
CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COREPER- Committee of Permanent Representatives 
COSAC- Conference of Parliamentary Committees of European Union Affairs of the 
Parliaments of European Union 
Council- Council of the European Union 
CSDP- Common Security and Defense Policy 
EAC- European Affairs Committee 
EE- Estonia 
8 
 
EP- European Parliament 
ESM- European Stability Mechanism 
EU- European Union 
LT- Lithuania 
LV- Latvia 
MEP- Member of European Parliament 
MP- Member of (national) parliament 
OMC- Open Method of Coordination 
SEA- Single European Act 
 
 
  
9 
 
Introduction	
 
The parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs emerged as a study subject after the adoption 
of the Single European Act in 1986 and with subsequent EU treaties, which deepened the 
integration. Likewise with the EU’s Nordic and CEE enlargements the subject has 
continuously increased in relevance. The reason for it is simple: even though the body directly 
representing the citizens of the European Union, the European Parliament, has received more 
and more powers with each EU treaty, the Council still remains the most powerful EU 
institution (EP 2012). 
The problematic issue is that the Council is made up not from direct representatives of the 
people, but by representatives of governments, who are held accountable to their respectable 
peoples indirectly, through national parliaments (EP 2012). Since the decisions taken by the 
Council are fundamentally important for all citizens of the EU and since such chains of power 
delegation are prone to many agency problems (Strom 1999), it is equally important to have 
sufficient understanding how the governments are held accountable for their EU policies to 
their parliaments in each EU member state. 
In this context, this MA thesis provides an account of the character and efficiency of this 
process in the three Baltic states. Though this study is not the first attempt to analyze the 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic states (Kietz 
2006; Karlas 2011; Winzen 2012; Ilakyte 2009; Zimina 2012), it is still a novel and valuable 
contribution to the field for two reasons. First, it employs a more qualitative and 
comprehensive approach to the measurement of the dependent variable; second, it considers a 
new independent variable, regime type, which was overlooked by the previous studies.  
 
The framework used to measure the dependent variable (the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs) used in this study is, probably, the biggest 
contribution to the field this thesis has to offer. For the sake of clarity it is important to state 
from the beginning that this study looks into the ordinary or every day parliamentary scrutiny 
of European affairs measures (i.e. measures to scrutinize EU legislative proposals, planning 
documents and, if applicable, scrutiny of CSDP/CFSP and areas governed by the OMC) and 
does not analyze parliamentary behavior or powers in relation to the new EU treaties, as it is a 
completely independent sphere.  
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The method used here is a comprehensive synthesis of previous approaches used to measure 
this phenomenon which is further enhanced with indicators which allow to detect small, but 
nonetheless significant, peculiarities related to informal and unwritten rules of the 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs and various path-dependencies which shape the 
manner how this process is carried out. By using two to three times more indicators than in 
the average study in this field, this study seeks to capture as many as possible of the small, but 
influential nuances, which remained uncaptured by the previous studies (For more detailed 
description, please see Methodology part).   
 
This study has two distinct aims: 1. To assess the strength and the quality of the parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic States; 2. To compare them to each other and 
analyze the causes of the main differences.  
In order to achieve these aims, this study focusses on these questions:  
1. How is the parliamentary scrutiny process shaped? What are the main bodies 
involved? 
2. Why in each case was a particular scrutiny model chosen? How deeply are the 
scrutiny practices imbedded in legal acts? How much are they based on mere 
convention or unwritten agreement?  
3. What spheres of European policy are scrutinized?  
4. Do the responsible bodies have enough resources to carry out these tasks?  
5. What formal and informal powers do responsible scrutiny bodies have? How well do 
they make use of them in practice? 
6. What are the relations between the opposition and position within the scrutinizing 
bodies? What are the relations between parliament and the government? 
7. How strong is the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic States in 
absolute terms? How do they fare relative to each other? 
8. What factors account for variation in strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny 
measures?  
Data needed to answer these questions have been collected from three types of sources: legal 
documents (relevant constitutions and Rules of Procedure Acts of the Baltic Parliaments), 
insider interviews (members of EAC’s) and expert interviews (members of Academia).  
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The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main developments 
of the field of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. It groups the existing literature in 
this field into three distinct groups based on their epistemological approach to the issue and 
the methodology used. It also outlines the most important contributions to the filed made by 
each of these groups and explains how their measurement techniques relate to the model used 
in this study.  
Chapter 2, Methodology, presents the conceptualization of the dependent variable derived 
from principal agent theory. The second part of this chapter presents the operationalization of 
the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs and presents the outline 
of the indicators and overall measurement model used in the study. 
Chapter 3 deals with empirical data and measurement of the dependent variable. It shows that 
the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny is highest in Lithuania (where it is very high 
in absolute terms as well) and lowest in Latvia (where it is mediocre in absolute terms) with 
Estonia being placed in the middle (in both relative and absolute terms). 
Chapter 4, Model robustness, compares the measurement results of the model used in this 
study vis-à-vis two other prominently used and cited models, namely one used by Thomas 
Winzen in the article ““National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-
national and Longitudinal Comparison” (Winzen 2012) and the one developed by Jan Karlas 
in his article “Parliamentary control of EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: explaining 
the variation” (Karlas 2011)”. It also demonstrates that, even though previous models were 
successful in capturing the main tendencies, they have overlooked some important nuances 
and details which were captured by this study. 
Chapter 5 aims at providing an explanation for the variance in strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs among the Baltic states. It briefly reviews the other 
prominent independent variables mentioned in the previous studies (e.g. frequency of 
minority governments, public/party euroskepticism and parliamentary strength) and suggests 
a new independent variable- constitutional design (semi-presidential/parliamentary) to 
account for variation among the Baltic states. It demonstrates that constitutional design has 
played an important role in how the EACs were established and how the strength and quality 
of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs took shape in the three Baltic states. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that this independent variable is meaningful in the wider 
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regional context (CEE+ Nordic countries) in explaining the variation of the dependent 
variable among these states.  
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Chapter	1‐	Overview	of	the	previous	research	
 
The field of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs has always been a dynamic and rather 
turbulent field, which went from being dominated by claims that “national parliaments are 
late-comers and losers of European integration” (Maurer & Wessels 2001) to being dominated 
by claims that parliaments have “fought back” and developed sufficient measures to exercise 
political control of country’s European policy (Perrson & Wiberg 2011) in just over a decade. 
This proliferation of seemingly contradictory conclusions over a quite short period of time 
was brought about by two reasons: different methodologies used by the scholars of this field 
and an expansion of the research focus to include not only the “old” member countries of 
Western Europe, but also the Nordic and “Big Bang” accession countries. 
In this chapter the threefold analysis of existing research is presented. First, this chapter gives 
an overview how the conceptualization evolved and what different bodies of research added 
to it. Second, it presents how previous scholars operationalized the independent variable and 
what indicators they used to measure it. Third, this chapter gives an account of the main 
independent variables suggested by the previous studies.   
Conceptualization	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable‐	 strength	 and	 quality	 of	
parliamentary	scrutiny	of	EU	affairs	
 
Existing research can be divided into three major groups on the basis how the parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs has been conceptualized and operationalized. These three groups are 
Formal powers-focused research, New-Institutionalist research and research focused on 
explaining the variation among the EU member states. Both Formal powers-focused research 
and New-Institutionalist research emerged as means to evaluate the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs in a single country and thus focused exclusively on the 
dependent variable. However, they tend to focus on different aspects of this phenomenon, 
either on formal rules regarding this process or the actual behavior of how the national 
parliaments hold their governments accountable in this sphere.  
Formal	powers‐focused	research	
This approach to the study of parliamentary control of European affairs was the first attempt 
to shed some light on previously unstudied phenomenon and is still very viable and widely 
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used up to this day. It was inspired mostly by the so-called de-parliamentization thesis and 
sought to test it. This thesis states that ceteris paribus, accession to the EU tends to weaken 
national parliaments and strengthen the executive branch (hence the name de-
parliamentization). This occurs because competences, which previously were the sole domain 
of national parliaments, are being transferred to the EU, where the Council of Ministers, made 
up from the representatives on national governments have the final say. If a parliament does 
not develop efficient and powerful scrutiny mechanisms, its power vis-à-vis the government 
decreases.   
This approach was the earliest attempt to measure the dependent variable, strength and quality 
of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs - and partly because of this (the fact that at the 
time this field was just emerging and underdeveloped), it used a rather minimalist 
conceptualization of the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. 
Another reason for it was simple: such minimalist definition of the dependent variable 
allowed for relatively easy research and easy access to the data, as these formal rules are 
usually available online in English. Furthermore, such minimalist conceptualization allowed 
researchers to avoid many potential methodological pitfalls which became evident in other 
groups of research. Here the strength of scrutiny measures was conceptualized merely as 
parliament’s ability to hold the government accountable in this sphere as expressed by the 
formal rules (constitutional provisions or other legal acts).  
Researchers belonging to this group mainly looked how the process of parliamentary scrutiny 
of European affairs is carried out in various member states, what are the responsible 
institutional bodies and what powers and instruments do they have to scrutinize government’s 
actions (Mauer & Wessels 2001). They operated under the assumption that more formal 
powers ensure stronger and higher quality parliamentary scrutiny (ibid). This assumption was 
the main source of criticism from the next group of researchers, belonging to the New-
institutionalist camp.  
The most substantial volume from this wave of research was a collection of essays edited by 
Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels in 2001. It was the first really inclusive comparative 
research about the Europeanization of most of the EU-15’s national parliaments. This volume 
analyzed what institutional changes have occurred in all member states since Maastricht 
Treaty; what parliamentary scrutiny measures were employed in the member states; and how 
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each national parliament has participated in the preparations of Amsterdam Treaty (Maurer & 
Wessels 2001).  
The analysis revealed that very few parliaments (Austrian, Danish and Swedish) have 
developed efficient measures to scrutinize their governments and thus maintain adequate 
levels of control over the EU matters (Maurer and Wessels 2001). Even though almost all 
parliaments in the member states have created European Affairs Comities (EAC’s) and were 
participating in the Conference of Parliamentary Comities for Union Affairs (COSAC) they 
did not have enough legal power, information and resources to efficiently scrutinize their 
governments. Furthermore, parliaments seemed to be little interested in EU affairs in general 
and did not even use the leverage they had in preparing the Amsterdam Treaty. This has led 
the editors of this volume to conclude that national parliaments were “late comers and losers 
of European integration” (Maurer & Wessels 2001). Later inquiries made in this field using 
the same methodology basically reaffirmed the findings of the Maurer and Wessels volume 
(Perrson & Wiberg 2011, p. 201). 
This particular volume is significant in a couple of ways. First, national parliamentary 
scrutiny systems were grouped into mandate- and document-based ones. Mandate-based 
systems meant that responsible parliamentary bodies (e.g. the EACs or the plenary) issue 
mandates on how the government should vote in the Council negotiations. Meanwhile 
document-based scrutiny systems focused on the analysis of the most important EU 
documents (upcoming treaties, White or Green books, strategies) trying to assess the 
implications these pieces of legislation might have on the member states and the best course 
of action in relation to these documents. 
 Both systems have their virtues, as a mandate system allows stricter and direct control, while 
a document system allows the earlier involvement of the scrutinizing body, thus potentially 
giving it the opportunity to make some changes to early phases of a document’s preparation. 
Even though this distinction refers more to ideal-type scenarios (many EAC’s have both 
mandating powers and scrutinize the early drafts of EU documents) it is still important and 
used by many scholars today (Karlas 2011).  
Due to the fact that many EAC are using the mixed systems (they have an ability to issue 
mandates as well as scrutinize the planning documents) in this study the distinction between 
document-based and mandate-based systems is made based on the criteria whether or not 
EAC can issue a mandate to the government prior to the Council negotiations. Based on this 
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distinction, in this study, mandate-based systems are considered to be stronger than the 
document-based ones.  
Soon after the Mauer and Wessels volume was published, it received criticism from the 
academic community for minimalist conceptualization and operationalization of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. According to these critics, focusing only on legal 
and formal aspects of parliamentary scrutiny does not reveal the full picture, because how 
well the formal powers are used on the daily basis is equally important (Auel 2005). These 
criticisms were further developed in the New-Institutionalist approach to parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs studies. Critics from the Independent variable-focused research camp 
mostly disagreed with the overarching conclusions that national parliaments are “late-comers 
and losers of EU integration” for being too radical (Perrson & Wiberg 2011). 
New‐Institutionalist	approach	
As mentioned above, this body of research arose from the dissatisfaction with the Formalistic 
approach. Researchers from this group provided a genuinely new way to conceptualize the 
dependent variable. According to this group of research, strong and high quality 
parliamentary scrutiny cannot be characterized by scrutinizing body’s capability to control the 
government’s actions alone. Another, equally important aspect is willingness of the 
scrutinizing body to carry out its tasks (Auel 2005). After all, what good are huge formal 
powers to scrutinize government’s European policy, if they are not used?  
Furthermore, this body of research claimed that in certain scenarios willingness to scrutinize 
the government’s actions are even more important than formal powers, as willing parliaments 
can use techniques, which are not prescribed by legal powers (such as issuing non-binding 
declarations, media involvement, etc.) to successfully scrutinize government’s actions (Auel 
& Bentz 2005).  
One of the most cited articles from this group of researchers analyzed three national 
parliaments (British, German and Danish), which corresponded to three different levels of 
strength of parliamentary scrutiny, according to Formalist researchers (namely 
aforementioned volume by Maurer & Wessels). Even though the British Parliament did not 
have many formal powers to scrutinize the government’s European policy, and was thus 
classified as weak by Formalist researchers, a new focus on behavioral aspect revealed that 
House of Commons was often more active than its German or Danish counterparts and it used 
a wide array of informal measures (like non-binding declarations, media involvement) to keep 
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the government accountable in this sphere. The Danish parliament, on the contrary, was often 
hindered by strong scrutiny powers it has. It was shown that Folketing was often reluctant to 
issue binding mandates to the government, even though it had power to do so, because such a 
rigid measure would leave government with too little room to maneuver in the Council 
negotiations (Auel and Bentz 2005). The hard choice scrutinizing bodies have to make in this 
sphere between strict mandates (and thus strong and direct control) and leaving government 
with some room to maneuver in order not to jeopardize the entire Council negotiations was 
named “scrutiny dilemma” (Auel 2005; Auel & Bentz 2005) and this was one of the most 
notable contributions from this body of research to the field.   
Later analyses from this group of scholars added another dimension to the conceptualization 
of strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs: deliberation (or 
inclusiveness) (Auel 2007). The researchers pointed out a simple paradox: in parliamentary 
systems with majority governments, parliamentary majority and the government are basically 
the same group. This means that the government’s interests are the same as those of the 
parliamentary majority. Therefore, in order to have not only strong, but also high quality 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, the scrutinizing body must not only have formal 
powers to scrutinize and be willing to use them, but also must fulfill the deliberation function, 
i.e. allowing opposition members to express their opinions and suggestions and to influence 
the final outcome of parliamentary scrutiny (Auel 2007). This is the main reason why in this 
study the dependent variable is referred to as “strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny 
of European affairs” (instead of just “strength of scrutiny”). 
Despite these contributions to the conceptualization of parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs, this group of research had one inherit problem. It has never provided a concrete 
framework for research and did very little in terms of operationalization (abovementioned 
research about the three parliaments is actually one of the rare examples of empirical analysis 
from this group of scholars). 
Research	focused	on	explaining	the	variation	
As the name of this body of research implies, its main aim has been to compare the strength 
and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs among the member states and to 
find out what independent variables can explain the variation among them. Therefore, the 
main contributions of this body of research are outlined in the second and third parts of this 
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chapter, which deal with operationalization of the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. 
However, this body of research made some contributions to the conceptualization of the 
dependent variable as well. They added two new dimensions to the conceptualization on top 
of the existing ones, namely Access to information and Resources.  
As agency theory suggests, delegation process (in this case when parliament delegates power 
to the government) is prone to many problems, one of which is information asymmetry 
between the principle and agent (Strom 1999, Lukosaitis 2007). Therefore to ensure the 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, parliaments not only have 
to have substantial formal powers, willingness to scrutinize their governments and be 
inclusive to the opposition, but also they must have access to all the information both about 
the government’s activities in this sphere and to all the information that reaches the 
government from the EU (Winzen 2012, Karlas 2011, Kietz 2006).  
Furthermore, since the amount of information is really enormous, in order to scrutinize the 
government’s actions in this sphere, parliaments have to have enough resources and time to 
carry out their tasks. Otherwise, scrutinizing bodies would become buried under the huge 
amount of information and would not be able to perform parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs in a high quality manner.  
This study uses all the aforementioned dimensions of conceptualization of the dependent 
variable and adds some new ones. This is discussed in the next chapter- “Methodology”, 
section “Conceptualization”.        
Operationalization	
Formal	powers‐focused	research	
Due to their minimalist conceptualization of the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny 
of European affairs, the researchers, belonging to this group, used a very small set of 
indicators to measure the dependent variable. The main indicators used in this body of 
research were: 
1. Kind of scrutiny system used (mandate based vs. document based). 
2. Ability to issue binding mandates. 
3. Kind of consequences, if government deviates from the mandate. 
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4. Existence of Scrutiny reserve powers (scrutiny reserve means scrutinizing body’s 
ability to postpone its decision and thus government’s vote in the Council until 
scrutinizing body has had enough time to get acquainted with the legislative act 
proposal). 
5. Ability to scrutinize EU’s foreign policy. 
6. Ability to scrutinize planning documents (White and Green books, strategies, etc.) 
(Mauer & Wessels 2001). 
All these indicators appear in the measurement model used in this study in “Formal powers” 
and “Scope” dimensions (See next chapter, Methodology, section “Operationalization”). 
New‐Institutionalist	research		
The notions from the New-Institutionalist group of research are much harder to 
operationalize. One way is to use such indicators as number of EAC meetings per year, the 
number of documents analyzed and the number of resolutions or mandates issued by the EAC 
per year. However, this approach has one serious drawback: national parliaments operate 
under different sets of rules, which can seriously influence the amount of 
resolutions/mandates issued or the number of EAC meetings (Karlas 2011). Another way to 
measure these aspects is to talk to the insiders of the process, namely the EAC members and 
from that capture the subtle nuances of how willing is the EAC to make the best use of its 
powers by asking questions like “How often is the scrutiny reserve used?” and “How strict are 
the issued mandates? (for mandate-based systems) (Persson & Wiberg 2011; EP 2012). It is 
important to note, that, unfortunately, the notion of inclusiveness brought about by this group 
of research was never thoroughly operationalized.  
The present study uses all behavioralist indicators except the number of resolutions/mandates 
issued, as this indicator is especially dependent on the parliamentary rules of procedure.  
Research	focused	on	explaining	the	variation	
Researchers from this group have not yet reached a consensus on how best to operationalize 
the conceptual dimensions they have added to this field of study. For instance, some 
researchers operationalize the resource dimension by counting the number of administrators, 
who deal with European policy issues, working in the parliaments (EP 2012). This indicator is 
good, but can be difficult to apply to large n studies, where countries of different sizes are 
compared. For instance, due to its sheer size alone, it is obvious that there would be more 
administrators working with European policy issue in Bundestag than in the parliaments of 
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Cyprus or Luxemburg. Moreover, how this relates to overall quality and strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny among these countries would still be unclear. 
Other researchers operationalized this notion by looking into whether or not EAC is a separate 
institution (committee) or a sub-committee and whether the other standing sectorial 
committees (and thus their resources) are involved in the parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs process (Winzen 2012; Karlas 2011). They have also suggested the indicator 
“Government memoranda” or i.e. whether the government is obliged to present the EAC with 
a document, which would set the priorities and potential impacts of EU legislative proposals 
in order to help the parliament cope with the information overload (Winzen 2012). Time 
aspect is usually measured by looking into how much time the EAC usually has to prepare its 
opinion/mandate (Kietz 2006). 
In this body of research the Information dimension is most often operationalized by looking 
into, whether the parliament is able to freely and easily access all the information related to 
this sphere of scrutiny or if it has to request such information from the government (Winzen 
2012). All these indicators are used in the measurement model of this study (See next 
chapter). 
Independent	variables	
Previous research on the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, 
which concentrated not only on measurement and assessing the dependent variable, but also 
attempted to find the causes of its variation came up with a rather long list of independent 
variables and up to this day there still is no clear consensus which of them are the most 
influential. Here seven most frequently mentioned independent variables are presented. They 
can be divided into two major groups- systemic-level variables (which are mostly associated 
with popular attitudes and political culture of the country) and institutional-level (dealing with 
a country’s institutional design). 
Systemic-level variables: 
1. Public Euroskepticism (measured as a percentage of Euroskeptic people in the 
population) (Bergman 1997, 2000; Hamerly 2007; Kietz 2006; Pahre 1997; Raunio 
2005; Rozenberg 2002). 
2. Party Euroskepticism (measured as electoral gains of Euroskeptic parties) (Kietz 2006; 
Pahre 1997; Raunio 2005). 
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3. Frequency of minority governments (measured as a percentage of minority 
governments) (Bergman 1997; 2000; Martin 2000; Pahre 1997; Raunio 2005; 
Rozenberg 2002; Saafield 2005). 
4. Political culture (measured by the share of Catholic/Orthodox people in the 
population) (Bergman 2000; Raunio 2005). 
5. Timing of the EU accession (Bergman 1997; Hamerly 2007; Kietz 2006; Rozenberg 
2002; Saalfeld 2005). 
Institutional level variables:  
1. General power of the parliament (no consensus how to best measure this variable) 
(Hamerly 2007; Kietz 2006; Raunio 2005; Rozenberg 2002). 
2. Political structure (unitary or federal) (Bergman 1997; Rozenberg 2002). 
These independent variables connect to the dependent variable, the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs as follows: it stands to reason that parliamentary scrutiny 
of European politics would be stronger in the countries with Euroskeptic populations or many 
Euroskeptic parliamentary parties because these actors would perceive EU affairs with more 
caution and reluctance. Furthermore, stronger scrutiny is to be expected where minority 
governments are more prevalent as parliamentary majority would continuously attempt to 
impose its will onto the minority government (Bergman 1997; 2000; Martin 2000; Pahre 
1997; Raunio 2005; Rozenberg 2002; Saafield 2005). 
Some of the studies (Bergman 2000; Raunio 2005) have also claimed that in non-protestant 
countries parliamentary scrutiny is weaker as the population is more lenient towards the 
government. It is usually acknowledged that EU accession timing generally has the greatest 
explanatory power, as countries which joined EU during the latest enlargements not only had 
the most time to soak in the best practices, but also were much more aware of the need to 
develop strong parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs measures because they experienced 
competence transfer from national parliaments to the EU instantly and not incrementally as 
the “old” EU member states (Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012).  
It is also acknowledged that parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is stronger in the 
countries, where the parliament has greater power because it continuously tries to reassert its 
power vis-à-vis the government (Hamerly 2007; Kietz 2006; Raunio 2005; Rozenberg 2002). 
Finally, it has been pointed out that the parliamentary scrutiny of European politics tends to 
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be stronger in the federal states, because the representatives from the regions compete with 
each other to get the best deal for their constituency (Bergman 1997; Rozenberg 2002). 
 This study pays the most attention to three IVs- Public and Party Euroskepticism and general 
powers of the parliaments. Reasons for this choice are simple. Since the empirical part of this 
study is limited to the analysis of the Baltic states, only the variables that could potentially 
explain the variation among the Baltic states (i.e. those aspects in which Baltic states wary) 
are chosen. All three Baltic states are unitary, they joined the EU at the same time, the 
minority governments there are so rare that it would not make sense to measure their 
frequency, and, even though they historically belonged to different confessions (Estonia and 
Latvia- protestant; Lithuania- catholic), after the five decades of Soviet rule, they emerged as 
equally secular.  
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Chapter	2‐	Methodology	
Conceptualization	
In this study the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is 
conceptualized through an ideal- type approach. It means that in order to accurately assess the 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, first it is necessary to 
develop an understanding how the perfect parliamentary scrutiny of this sphere should look 
like. This understanding then can be used as a benchmark, against which the situation in the 
Baltic states is measured. 
Here the perfect parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is conceptualized as an 
instrument, capable of overcoming delegation problems, mentioned in principal agent theory, 
namely information asymmetry and accountability problems (Strom 1999). In order to 
overcome these problems parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs has to have six 
attributes: Strength, Willingness, Capability, Inclusiveness, Transparency and 
Consistency. The subsequent part of this section provides the overview how these attributes 
are broken down into ten dimensions and how these dimensions are then grouped into three 
groups based on their importance.  
Strength is the attribute which refers to parliament’s ability to successfully scrutinize 
government’s actions or in, other words, parliament’s ability to impose its will on the 
government. This attribute has three distinct dimensions- Formal powers (set of powers and 
rights parliament has to perform parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, as prescribed by 
the legal acts); Scope (parliament’s abilities to scrutinize all aspects of European policy (e.g. 
CFSP or COREPER meetings)); and Character of parliament-government relations 
(parliament’s ability to ensure that government performs all its duties well (e.g. provides 
required information on time)). This attribute appeared as a part of the dependent variable 
conceptualization from the very first studies in this field and it relates very closely to 
Formalist conceptualization of the dependent variable (See previous chapter). One of the 
novelties of this study is that here these dimensions, though all being extremely important, do 
not carry an equal weight. Here Formal powers are regarded as absolutely most  important 
to overall strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, whereas other 
two dimensions, Scope and Character of parliament-government relations are regarded to 
be a bit less – simply important to the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of 
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European affairs. This differentiation is reflected in the operationalization of the dependent 
variable and the data aggregation process.  
Willingness refers to the parliament’s will to use its powers to scrutinize government’s 
actions using either its established formal powers or informal measures. It is just as important 
as the Strength, because well established and broad array of formal rights means little, if they 
are not used. In the operationalization of this variable, willingness attribute is expressed 
through Informal powers dimension which is regarded to be most important for overall 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs.  
Capability attribute refers to the resources parliament needs to carry out these tasks. These 
resources are of various types: information about the sphere, human resources to analyze it 
and time to do so.  These resources are just as important as the previous two aspects, as their 
absence would jeopardize the parliamentary control of European affairs, even if parliament 
has both power and willingness to carry it out. In line with previous studies, here the two 
dimensions of this attribute do not carry and equal weight as well. It has been pointed out that 
capability to process information in time is more important than the access to information 
itself (Winzen 2012), therefore, here human resources are regarded to be most important, 
whereas access to information- importnat for overall strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs.  
Inclusiveness as a separate dimension of strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs first was brought forward by the New-institutionalist group of researchers 
(See previous chapter) it corresponds to the need to ensure of key parliamentary functions- 
deliberation- a requirement that the opposition members would also be included and could 
have an ability to influence the outcome of this process (Auel 2007). In this study this 
attribute is understood as having two dimensions- Inclusiveness within a national 
parliament (Parliamentization) and Inclusion of MEPs (European dimension) once again 
these attributes are not equally influential. Parliamentization is regarded to be important, 
whereas European dimension- instrumental (i.e. helpful, but not fundamentally important) 
for overall strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. 
Consistency attribute refers to how deeply parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
practices are entrenched into regular operations of the parliament, why have taken their 
present shape and, if they are resilient to changes in the parliament after the election. Analysis 
of the temporal dimension of the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is a new trend, 
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undertaken by only a few scholars, however, it is important, as the scrutiny of European 
affairs process can be prone to various path-dependencies (Winzen 2012). This attribute is 
operationalized in Structuration dimension and regarded to be instrumental for overall 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. 
Transparency as a separate was not yet included into conceptualization of the strength and 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs by the other scholars, though some 
transparency indicators appeared in previous research (EP 2012). The importance of this 
dimension can be derived from principal-agent theory, as transparency ensures the link 
between the parliament and the ultimate sovereign- the people and it allows to address the 
agency problems in the first step of the delegation process. This attribute is regarded to be 
Instrumental for overall strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. 
In sum, the six attributes which parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs has to have in 
order to be strong and of high quality are: Strength, Willingness, Capability, Consistency, 
Inclusiveness and Transparency. They can be broken down into 10 separate dimensions that 
are used to measure the dependent variable in this study. These are: Formal powers, Informal 
powers, Resources, Information management, Relations with the government, Scope, 
Parliamentzation, Structuration, European dimension and Transparency (for more detailed 
description and operationalization of each dimension see next section of this chapter).  
As it is easy to see, these dimensions are all important to the overall strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, however they are not equally important (e.g. that 
Formal powers dimension is more important than Transparency). Therefore, these ten 
dimensions are divided into three groups based on their importance. These are “The most 
important”, “Important” and Instrumental. 
Most important: 
Formal powers 
Informal powers 
Resources 
Important: 
Relations with government 
Parliamentization 
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Scope 
Access to information 
Instrumental: 
Structuration 
European dimension 
Transparency 
Operationalization	
“The	most	important”	group	
This large grouping of indicators could be best described as a set of preconditions, the 
absence of which would seriously jeopardize the integrity of the parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs. It consists of three sets of indicators: Formal powers, Informal powers and 
Resources. 
Formal powers 
These powers are the core of effective parliamentary scrutiny. The aim of this dimension is to 
analyze what formal powers the scrutinizing body has to control government’s actions in this 
policy sphere. It focuses on several aspects: Scrutinizing body’s ability to issue mandates, set 
its own agenda, character of the mandates, adaptability of the scrutiny process to the shortages 
of time and new details surfacing during Council negotiations. In total, it uses seven 
indicators to measure this dimension of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs: 
1. What kind of scrutiny system is used- document based or mandate based? (Mauer & 
Wessels 2001, EP 2012; Karlas 2011). 
2. Can the EAC adopt resolutions on its own? (EP 2012; Mauer & Wessels 2001) 
3. Can the EAC set its own agenda? 
4. Are the mandates binding? (Mauer & Wessels 2001; Karlas 2011; Winzen 2012) 
5. What happens, if government deviates from the mandate? (Winzen 2012; Karlas 2011) 
6. Does the EAC have scrutiny reserve powers? (EP 2012) 
7. Does it have ad hoc scrutiny powers? (ability to update/re-issue mandate during the 
Council negotiations)?  
Naturally, this dimension is inspired by the first wave of the research of parliamentary control 
of European affairs and borrows a lot from it, especially, from the Mauer and Wessels volume 
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(Mauer & Wessels 2001). However, in this study the focus is expanded a little bit by looking 
into if EACs can set their own agenda and employ ad hoc scrutiny powers. 
Informal powers 
The aims of this dimension is to analyze, how well do the scrutinizing bodies make use of 
their rights and powers in practice and to find out (if applicable) how do they cope with the 
absence of formal powers and how do they address the scrutiny dilemma. The previous 
research has shown that some of the formally strong EAC’s do not make full use of their 
powers, while some weaker scrutinizing bodies employ ingenious instruments to scrutinize 
their governments (Auel 2005, Raunio 2005, EP 2012). In other words, this dimension 
addresses how interested and how keen parliaments are to scrutinize their government’s 
European policy. This dimension has seven indicators to address how well the Baltic 
parliaments make use their rights in practice. 
1. How often EAC meets? (Karlas 2011) 
2. How many documents they scrutinize per year? (Karlas 2011) 
3. How strict are the mandates? 
4. How is scrutiny dilemma addressed? 
5. Is scrutiny reserve powers used frequently? (EP 2012) 
6. Are ad hoc powers used frequently? 
7. Does the EAC employ any informal measures to pressure the government? 
This dimension borrows two behavioral indicators from the study “Parliamentary control of 
EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: explaining the variation” by Jan Karlas (Karlas 
2011) and one from recent OPAL/Tepsa study “Democratic Control in the Member States of 
the European Council and the Euro zone summits” (EP 2012). It also expands this dimension 
by adding indicators about the strictness of the mandates, ad hoc powers, scrutiny dilemma 
and measures to pressure the government.  
Resources     
Resources are fundamentally important in order to have effective parliamentary scrutiny of 
EU affairs. What sets this particular policy sphere apart from others, subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny, is extremely high inflow of documents on a very large variety of 
topics that require attention and expertise. Even the body that has huge formal and/or informal 
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powers to scrutinize the government’s actions, it would be helpless, if it did not have enough 
resources to carry out such task.  
Even though the question of resources was included into some previous studies (EP 2012, 
Winzen 2012, Karlas 2011), they usually were not considered to be so important. In some 
studies this dimension was operationalized simply as existence or absence of a standing 
committee, which deals with parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs (Winzen 2012) or it 
seemed to disappear from data aggregation process all together (EP 2012). In this dimension, 
the novel contribution of this study is new way how to perceive the importance of resources 
for overall strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny. This dimension has four inidcators: 
1. How many administrators, dealing with European issues, work in the parliament? (EP 
2012) 
2. How much time does the EAC have to prepare its position? 
3. Does it feel constrains due to human resource or time shortages? 
4. How are they addressed? 
From the OPAL/Tepsa study, this research borrows one indicator (amount of administrators) 
to measure the resource dimension, others are new and appeared only in this study. 
Interplay 
All three dimensions belonging to this group are absolutely necessary in order to have high 
quality and strong parliamentary scrutiny. What sets these three dimensions apart from the 
other seven, is that, even if parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in any given state is 
completely lacking in any of those seven dimensions, that would not jeopardize the integrity 
of the process, like it would, if any of these three dimensions was lacking.  
For instance, if any state would score high on Formal and Informal powers, but low on 
Resources, that would mean, that that national parliament is theoretically capable and willing, 
but, in practice, unable to scrutinize its government’s European policy. If a parliament scored 
high on Formal powers and Resources, but low on Informal powers, that would mean that this 
parliament is capable, but unwilling to engage in parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. 
Finally, if a parliament scored high on Informal powers and Resources, but low on formal 
powers, it would mean that the parliamentary scrutiny would be erratic and inconsistent. 
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“Important”	group	
Even if a national parliament would score high in all three dimensions belonging to the “The 
most important” grouping, it would account for only the rudimentary aspects of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs both in terms of strength and quality. They are necessary, but 
they alone are not enough in order to have high quality and strong parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs. Dimensions - included into “Important” are of smaller significance than 
those of the previous group, but they still can significantly impact the overall strength and 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European politics. Dimensions in this group are: Scope, 
Relations with the government, Access to information and Parliamentization.  
Scope 
This dimension measures the scope of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. Even 
though the Council meetings are the ultimate place, where certain pieces of legislation are 
adopted or rejected, even having mandating power to instruct government to vote “yes” or 
“no” is often insufficient scrutiny instrument, because it is unwieldy and crude. Strong 
parliamentary scrutiny should also include the ability to scrutinize European legislation in its 
early stages (white or green books) and the country’s position in COREPER meetings. Given 
that in recent years the scope of EU’s foreign policy has expanded, ability to scrutinize CFSP 
is also very important. 
The idea that mandating is insufficient and unwieldy was first brought about by Katrin Auel 
in the second wave of Europeanization research (Auel 2005). It was partly reflected in the 
TEPSA/OPAL study, which included questions about CFSP and COREPER meetings (EP 
2012). In this study, this outlook is supplemented by the additional focus given to the spheres 
of EU policy governed via open method of coordination. This study measures this dimension 
with four indicators: 
1. Are CFSP/CSDP policies scrutinized by the parliament? (EP 2012) 
2. Are (de facto) planning documents (strategies, Green and White books) scrutinized? 
(Winzen 2012, Karlas 2011) 
3. Are COREPER meetings scrutinized? (EP 2012) 
4. Are policy areas governed by OMC scrutinized? 
Questions regarding the areas governed by the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) were 
first raised by Tapio Raunio in the article “Does the OMC really benefit national 
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parliaments?” (Raunio 2006). However, to the author’s best knowledge, this indicator was not 
previously included in comparative research. 
Relations with government 
Relations between the parliament and the government are an indirect indicator of the strength 
of parliamentary scrutiny. If government is somewhat arrogant or inconsiderate towards the 
parliament, it is a clear signal that parliament is not in control of government’s actions. This 
dimension looks into both the attitudes and behavior of these two actors in order to grasp the 
power relations between them. 
This is a relatively new aspect, which so far was included only in OPAL/TEPSA study (EP 
2012). This dimension is partly based on OPAL questionnaire, however, it expands it a bit to 
include questions about who usually perseveres in case of divergence of opinions between 
EAC and the government and, if EAC feels to be in control of the situation. It also adds the 
indicator, whether or not the government is legally obliged to report to the EAC about the 
course of Council negotiations- this step is crucial to test, how well the government has 
adhered to the issued mandate. These three aspects, while being extremely important were 
overlooked by the previous studies. In total eight indicators are used to measure this 
dimension: 
1. Does the government have to present the EAC with explanatory memoranda to help 
the EAC to set up its priorities? (Winzen 2012, EP 2012) 
2. Does the government submit all the required information and documents in a timely 
fashion? (EP 2012) 
3. Do government representatives participate in the EAC meetings (EP 2012)? 
4. What level representatives usually participate? 
5. How often do EAC’s and government’s positions diverge? 
6. Who gets the upper-hand in these situations? 
7. Does EAC feel to be in control? 
8. Is the government legally obliged to report back to the EAC about the course and 
results of the Council negotiations? 
Information management 
The issues regarding the access to information have been raised by a number of previous 
studies (Winzen 2012, Karlas 2011, Kietz 2006, EP 2012). However, there the focus was 
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placed just on whether or not all the information related to this sphere is accessible to the 
EACs (Karlas 2011, Kietz 2006, EP 2012) and whether or not governments are obliged to 
provide them with explanatory memoranda (Winzen 2012) (this indicator appears in the 
previous dimension of this study). This thesis expands this dimension a bit by focusing on the 
exact scheme how the information reaches the parliament and adding a behavioral indicator 
(who de facto selects the majority of documents to be scrutinized) to see how well the EAC 
utilize their information access rights in practice. In total this study uses three indicators to 
measure this dimension: 
1. Can the EAC access all the information or just parts of it? (Winzen 2012) 
2. How does exactly the relevant information about this sphere reach the EAC? 
3. Who de facto selects majority of the documents to be scrutinized? 
Parliamentization 
This dimension measures the relations between the scrutinizing body and the rest of the 
parliament. Concentrating mostly on the relations with parliament’s standing committees, 
where most of working expertise is accumulated and the relations between the government 
and opposition factions within the scrutinizing body. It was mentioned before that the 
scrutinizing bodies face the huge inflow of information on varying topics; therefore access to 
expertise accumulated in the sectorial committees could be very helpful in order to cope with 
this task.  
Furthermore, government-opposition relations are also important, since, if the opposition is 
continuously overridden, it jeopardizes the entire parliamentary scrutiny process. The 
questions about majority-opposition relations were first raised in the second wave of 
parliamentary scrutiny research (Auel 2007). This study, however, is the first to address these 
questions empirically.   
This study uses nine indicators to measure this dimension of parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs: 
1. What portion of the MPs belongs to the EAC? (EP 2012) 
2. Can sectorial committees be involved in scrutiny process? (Karlas 2011; EP 2012; 
Winzen 2012) 
3. Are they regularly? (Karlas 2011) 
4. Is there a legal requirement to do so?  
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5. Are the joint sessions with other committees organized? 
6. Is the plenary involved in the parliamentary scrutiny of this sphere? (Karlas 2011; EP 
2012) 
7. How? 
8. Are the opposition members adequately represented in the EAC? 
9. Do they feel that they are able to influence the outcome of this process? 
Instrumental	group	
This grouping entails three dimensions that can further enhance the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. However, unlike in the previous two groupings, 
scoring low in here would not jeopardize the integrity of the process. Dimensions belonging 
to this group are: Structuration, Transparency and European dimension. 
Structuration 
The aim of this dimension is to measure how deeply and rigidly EAC’s procedures are 
imbedded in country’s legal system. This dimension follows the assumption from the existing 
researches that more structured and deeply imbedded rules regarding the parliamentary 
scrutiny procedures result in higher and smoother continuity of after parliamentary elections, 
which in turn result in higher quality scrutiny (Mauer & Wessels 2001). Furthermore, well 
established set of rules ensure that scrutiny strength and form will not be dependent on 
incumbent personalities and their personal relations with the government.  
This dimension is partly borrowed from the first wave of research and was also reflected in 
the study done by TEPSA and OPAL centers (EP 2012), however, in this study this 
dimension is expanded to included questions about the origins of the EAC and the reasons for 
choosing a particular model. These questions were included to bring out various aspects 
related to the path-dependencies in the EAC. The necessity to include longitudinal dimension 
appeared in the number of recent studies, showing that path dependencies often play a key 
role in establishing strong and effective parliamentary scrutiny (Winzen 2012). In total this 
dimension is measured with four indicators: 
1. Is the role of the EAC prescribed by the legal provisions or the Constitution? (EP 
2012) 
2. How detailed are these provisions? 
3. How did the EAC exist- did it have any predecessors? 
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4. Why was this particular parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs model chosen? 
Transparency 
The media and the public of ten play an important role in influencing government’s decision 
what position to take towards certain EU-level issue (Auel 2005). If the scrutinizing body’s 
dealings are transparent and open to the media and the public, not only can this act as a tool to 
involve them in the scrutiny process, but also as an impetus for the scrutinizing body to be 
more thorough with its work, which in turn means better quality. Furthermore, transparency 
ensures that ordinary citizens can follow the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
process and, if needed, can hold MPs accountable for their actions. This dimension is 
measured with three indicators: 
1. How transparent is the parliamentary scrutiny process to the public (how much 
information is available)? 
2. Are the reports, minutes or summaries publically available? (EP 2012) 
3. Does EAC ever organize open meetings?  
European dimension 
Having well established contacts with MEP’s and active participation in COSAC can also 
improve the quality of parliamentary scrutiny, because these two institutions act as an 
important avenue to get insider information on upcoming developments in the EU or to get 
acquainted with the parliamentary scrutiny process in other EU countries.  
The Treaty of Lisbon has endowed national parliaments of the EU member states with 
substantial arsenal of tools to have a greater impact on the EU legislative process. These 
mechanisms mostly establish more direct links between the national parliaments and EU 
institutions in order to give the parliaments the ability to stop EU legislative proposals, if they 
contradict the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Schtze 2009). Therefore, this 
dimension also includes two indicators about these new developments. One of them asks; if 
the rules of procedure acts have been amended to account for post-Lisbon realities, while the 
other checks, how active were the parliaments in using these new rights.  
These last two dimensions are also relatively new to the empirical research, appearing only in 
the recent OPAL/TEPSA study. This study uses the similar questions as the aforementioned 
study, only including the new question about the smaller regional gatherings of the national 
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parliaments, where MP’s can socialize and exchange best practices. This dimension is 
measured with six indicators: 
1. Are MEPs members of the EAC? (EP 2012) 
2. Are they involved in any way? (EP 2012) 
3. What is perception of COSAC within the EAC? 
4. Do EAC members take part in other meetings with their foreign colleagues apart from 
COSAC? 
5. Have the parliamentary rules of procedure acts have been amended to include 
parliamentary empowerment provisions of the Lisbon Treaty? Why? 
6. How active are the parliaments in using these rights? How actively they have directly 
communicated with the EU institutions? 
 
Formal	institutional	setup	
 
While it is not a proper dimension per se, as it takes no part in further data aggregation, 
formal institutional setup is a first part of the questionnaire, which is included in order to get 
an understanding of EAC’s place in country’s political system and EAC’s relations to the 
other institutions.  
Since this study utilizes methodology, which can be applied to the analysis of any EU 
member state, this part mostly deals with the type of electoral system and the role of 
parliament in relation to other institutions. It has been established that proportional electoral 
systems, strong parliaments and coalition governments are favorable conditions for strong 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs, whereas systems with weaker parliaments or 
majoritarian electoral systems usually result in weaker control (Mauer & Wessels 2001; 
Persson & Wiberg 2011; Karlas 2011; Kietz 2006; Winzen 2012).  
Therefore, the aim of this part is to measure how favorable is the formal institutional setup in 
a country for strong parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs. This part was included in this study 
because, even though the Baltic States are likely to look rather similar, this study aims not 
only to perform empirical analysis of the three countries, but also to establish a theoretical 
framework, which would be applicable to any EU country. 
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Country	score	
In this study the final result for the dependent variable is calculated as a single score. Some of 
the previous studies have brought forwards an idea that the dependent variable – strength and 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is multidimensional and rather than 
existence of strong or weak scrutiny measures, it is better to think about it as different modes 
or profiles of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs (EP 2012). This study acknowledges 
this notion and deems it to be a worthwhile pursuit for future studies that can really enrich the 
field of research on parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. However, since the existing 
studies of this kind tend to group the Baltic states very closely together or even in the same 
category, in this study, due to its scope, the dependent variable is measured as a uni-
dimensional one.    
Dimension	evaluation	
Based on the answers to the questions, each dimension will be given a score on the ordinal 
scale ranging from 1- Very Low to 5- Very High. . While admittedly such scoring can be 
subjective and is based merely on an analyst’s qualitative assessment of a country’s situation, 
the reliability of the current study will be increased by making available the full list of scores 
in the subsequent part of the thesis. 
Calculating	the	country	scores	
The final country score is calculated in three steps. First, all the dimension scores in a group 
are summed up. Second, this result is standardized to range between 0 and 1. Then the final 
score is calculated by this formula: 
"The	most	important"	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ ൬"ܫ݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ݐ"	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ ∗ 2 ൅ ܫ݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ݈ܽ	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁3 ൰ 
This formula was chosen because it best fits the way the dependent variable is conceptualized. 
First, since “The most important” dimension refers to the set of necessary conditions, absence 
of which would completely jeopardize the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs, its relation to other groups is expressed through multiplication (the final 
score can never be higher than that of “The most important” group and zero value in this 
group would result in overall 0 score). The other two group scores are added to each other; 
however, since “Important” group carries more weight, it has twice the impact on the final 
score than the Instrumental group.   
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Summary	
Summing up, this study offers a more comprehensive approach to the study of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs. It adds two new attributes to how the dependent variable is 
conceptualized- Inclusiveness and Consistency. It also offers some new attributes how this 
phenomenon can be measured. First, it uses the biggest and the most comprehensive set of 
indicators, to the author’s best knowledge, available to this day. Mostly it is achieved by not 
building the measurement model from scratch, but rather by synthesizing various existing 
approaches. Second, out of 52 indicators used in this study 30 are suggested by the author 
himself. Some of them are based on the insights of the previous studies (mainly Auel 2005; 
Auel 2007; EP 2012; Kietz 2006; Karlas 2011; Winzen 2012; Raunio 2005), but heavily 
modified to suit the needs of this study.  
Data	collection	
The data for this study has been collected from three major sources: 1. Legal provisions 
regarding the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process (Rules of Procedure Act of 
Riigikogu; Rules of Procedure Act of Saeima and Statute of Seimas); 2. Interviews with 
members of Academia (mostly those who filled country surveys for OPAL/TEPSA study 
“Democratic Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone 
summits” (EP 2012)); 3.Interviews with members of the Baltic European Affairs Committees. 
(The full list of data sources and list of interviews is presented in the next chapter). Also, 
some of the data points are taken from the earlier studies of the parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs, where the Baltic states were analyzed, namely Kietz 2006, Karlas 2011, 
Winzen 2012.  
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Chapter	3‐	Empirical	data	
 
This chapter presents the overview of the empirical data. The first section of this chapter 
provides overview of the data, structured according to dimension groups. In the second part 
the data is aggregated and the final country scores are presented.  
Formal	Institutional	Setup	
Naturally, due to their small, all three Baltic states have rather similar institutional designs. 
Since the topic of this study is parliamentary scrutiny, here only the most important aspects 
that can influence and shape the peculiarities of this process are described. 
First, all three states are unitary and have unicameral legislatures. Due to this institutional 
design, parliament plays the central role in these political systems. In all three Baltic states 
governments are formed by the biggest faction (be it a single party faction or a coalition 
faction) and is accountable to it.  
In all three states standing parliamentary committees play a central role in parliamentary 
proceedings, as the most preliminary deliberation and modifications are done there, rather 
than on the plenary.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise that one of the standing parliamentary 
committees is the key actor responsible for parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in each 
of the Baltic states. In Lithuania it is “Europos Reikalu Komitetas (European Affairs 
Committee)”; in Latvia “Eiropas Lietu Komisija (European Affairs Committee)”; in Estonia 
“Euroopa Liidu Asjade Komisjon (European Union Affairs Committee)”. For the sake of 
simplicity, in this study all three of these committees will be referred to as European Affairs 
Committee (EAC).   
Despite these major similarities, there are some important differences that need to be 
addressed as well. In Latvia the EAC is the sole actor responsible for parliamentary scrutiny 
of European affairs and it asks for assistance from other standing committees only in the 
unusual or very important instances. Meanwhile, in both Lithuania and Estonia Foreign 
Affairs Committee is in charge of scrutinizing Common Foreign and Security Policy and in 
other cases one of the standing committees assists the EAC with scrutinizing the European 
Affairs depending on the issue at hand.  
Finally, there is one more thing that needs to be accounted for- Lithuania has a directly 
elected president who takes part in the government formation process by selecting candidate 
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for the PM position and assisting him with candidate cabinet formation before sending 
candidate cabinet to the parliament for approval. In other words, Lithuania has all the features 
(from the political science point of view) to be called a semi-presidential regime (Gudzinskas 
& Matsuzato 2008; Elgie 1999) and this clearly sets it apart from Latvia and Estonia, which 
are purely parliamentary regimes. 
However, due to certain peculiarities of the early years of independence and ambiguity of 
Lithuanian Constitution, there were certain problems with demarcation between presidential 
and prime minister’s powers, which led to a case in Lithuanian Constitutional Court and its 
ruling that “Lithuania has a parliamentary regime with certain semi-presidential features” 
(Kuris 1998, Gudzinskas & Matsuzato 2008). This ruling had some paramount consequences 
which will not be addressed in depth in this study. However, it had one really important 
implication- it gave a legal basis for the legislative branch of government to carry out 
parliamentary scrutiny of all the executive branch’s policies, both the government’s as well as 
the president’s. The implications of this aspect are discussed in more detail in latter parts of 
this study. 
“The	most	important”	group	
Table 1: “The most important” group country scores 
Country Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Dimension  
Formal powers 5 3.5 4 
Informal powers 4.5 1.5 3 
Resources 5 1.5 2.5 
Total: 14.5 6.5 9.5 
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Table 2: “The most important” group 
Country: Lithuania Latvia Estonia  
Indicator: 
Formal Powers:    
Which scrutiny system is used: document 
based or mandate based? Mandate1 Mandate4 Mandate8 
Can EAC adopt resolutions in place of the 
plenary? Yes1 Yes4 Yes7 
Can it set its own agenda? Yes, de facto1;2 
Yes, hardly 
utilized4;5 Yes, hardly utilized7;10 
Are the mandates binding? Yes1 Yes6 Justified deviation7
What happens, if government deviates? Person, who deviated, loses his/her position in 
the government.2 
No, follow up 
procedure, nobody 
really knows.9 
Government representatives have to 
explain why they deviated before the 
EAC  ASAP.7 
Does EAC have scrutiny reserve powers? Yes, used consistently2 
Yes, hardly 
utilized5 No7;8 
Does EAC have ad hoc scrutiny powers? 
Yes, if government wants to deviate from the 
mandate in light of some unforeseen 
circumstances, government representative 
must call chairman of the EAC and ask to issue 
a new mandate.2;3 No4 No7;10 
Informal powers:     
How often does EAC meet? 2 times a week (~42 times a year)2 ~45 times a year8 ~30 times a year8
How many documents they scrutinize per 
year? ~308 ~68 ~308 
How strict are the mandates? Very strict.2;3 Not very5 
Usually moderate, but can be very 
strict10 
How is scrutiny dilemma addressed? Through ad hoc measures  Loose mandate Allowing for justified deviation  
Is scrutiny reserve used frequently? Yes2 No.5 N/A 
Ad hoc scrutiny powers? 1 or 2 times a year.3 N/A N/A 
Does the parliament use innovative 
techniques to pressure the government or 
cope with the absence of powers? 
Uses psychological pressure, if its needs are 
not addressed 2 No. No.10 
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Resources    
How many administrators work with EU 
affairs? Around 302 66 6 7 
How much time does EAC have to prepare 
its position? As much as possible1;2 Less than a week5 Almost as much as possible10 
Does it feel any constrains due to time or 
human resource shortages? No.2 Yes.5 Yes.10 
How they are addressed? N/A Not addressed 
By getting involved with legislation 
in the early level10 
 
Sources: 1-Statute of Seimas; 2- Interview with Petras Auštrevičius; Vilnius 11.07.2012; 3- Interview with Arminas Lydeka; Vilnius 25.07.2012; 
4- Rules of Procedure Act of Saeima; 5- Interview with Einars Cilinskis; via internet 27.02.2013; 6- Interview with Girts Ostrovskis; via internet 
04.03.2013; 7- Rules of Procedure Act of Riigikogu; 8- (Karlas 2011); 9- (EP 2012); 10-  Interview with Marko Mihkelson ; Tallinn 12.08.20
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Formal powers 
All three countries opted for rather similar model of parliamentary scrutiny, which is based on 
ex ante control by issuing voting instructions before the Council meetings (as opposed to 
document based scrutiny, which relies on early analysis of the documents and preparation of 
broader guidelines (Kietz 2006)). Furthermore, in all three cases the voting instructions or 
mandates are binding. However, a closer look at this issue reveals that behind this similarity 
lays very different notions and understandings what “binding mandate” means. In case of 
Estonia, “binding mandate” means that the government can deviate from the instructions only 
with a concrete and viable reasons (e.g. if new details surface during the negotiations in the 
Council) and has to justify its deviation before EAC as soon as possible. If such procedure is 
not followed, government representative might encounter political repercussions (demotion or 
losing the position in the government).  
In Latvian case, mandates are legally binding (EP 2012). However, the idea of “legally 
binding” mandate is a bit unclear in terms of what repercussions any deviation from such 
mandate would entail to the person who has done it. Since, it has never occurred to the best of 
Latvian EAC’s knowledge, such ambiguity persists. It is even more complicated, as Latvian 
EAC organizes follow up meetings, where government representatives have to report about 
the course of Council negotiations, only on the exceptional cases. In other words, Latvian 
EAC does not have a normal functioning mechanism to check, if government has followed the 
mandate.  
In Lithuania government must not under any circumstances deviate from the EAC’s mandate. 
Since it leaves government with extremely little room to maneuver during the Council 
negotiations, EAC has developed an instrument to address this issue. In case if new details 
surface during the Council negotiations and government wants to adjust its position, 
government representatives must call the chair of the EAC and he/she either calls an 
emergency EAC meeting or makes a personal judgment call and accepts responsibility for it. 
To the author’s best knowledge Lithuanian EAC is the only such committee in the EU which 
has such tool in its possession. It really empowers the EAC, as it can issue very strict and 
binding mandates to the government without facing the efficiency problems associated with 
the scrutiny dilemma. 
As for the other important parliamentary scrutiny tool “scrutiny reserve” (it means EAC’s 
right to postpone its decision and thus country’s vote in the Council until EAC has had 
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enough time to deliberate the issue at hand), only Lithuanian and Latvian EACs have it in 
their possession. However, making use of scrutiny reserve is a usual part of EAC’s activities 
(taking place approx. one a month) in Latvia- it is used only in very rare cases. Estonian EAC 
tries to compensate for the absence of this tool by earlier involvement and more ridged 
follow-up procedures after the Council meetings.  
Therefore, when it comes to Formal powers, Lithuania satisfies all the criteria for strong and 
high quality parliamentary scrutiny and is given a maximum score. In Estonian case, the 
formal powers are well established and strong as well; however the absence of scrutiny 
reserve, ad hoc scrutiny measures and allowing government to deviate from the mandate 
under justifiable circumstances, lowers Estonian score to 4. Situation in Latvia is somewhat 
similar to that of Estonia; however due to ambiguity of regulations regarding the 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process, it is impossible to tell, what happens, if 
government deviated from the given mandate during the Council negotiations, which lowers 
Latvian score to 3.5. This ambiguity really has a strong impact on overall strength and quality 
of parliamentary scrutiny of European process, even enough to outweigh the importance of 
scrutiny reserve powers.  
Informal powers 
In terms of Informal powers there also is a substantial variation among the Baltic states. Even 
though all three EACs meet roughly the same number of times per year, they differ 
substantially in the amount of documents they scrutinize. In this sphere Estonian EAC is an 
undisputed leader, analyzing roughly 60 documents per year, which is three times more than 
its Lithuanian counterpart, which in turn analyses three times more documents than Latvian 
EAC.  
The EACs also differ in the strictness of mandates they issue and the ways they address 
scrutiny dilemma. Lithuanian EAC prefers to issue rather strict mandates and address the 
scrutiny dilemma through ad hoc measures, while Estonian EAC’s mandate strictness varies 
and the scrutiny dilemma is addressed by allowing government to deviate from the mandate 
under justifiable circumstances. Whereas in Latvia mandates are usually loose and there is 
usually no follow-up procedure to check, how the government has adhered to the mandate.  
Furthermore, these committees differ in the way they use scrutiny reserve powers. In 
Lithuania it is part of usual routine, used approximately once a month, whereas in Latvia it is 
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used very rarely and in Estonia not available at all. Lithuanian EAC is the only one with ad 
hoc scrutiny powers, which are used about once a year. Finally, Lithuanian EAC is the only 
employing innovative techniques to keep the government in line, namely, the psychological 
pressure towards misbehaving government representatives (e.g. government official who was 
invited to the EAC’s session, but did not show up). 
Hence Lithuania receives 4.5 out of 5 in this dimension. This basically occurs due to 
relatively low amount of scrutinized documents per year. Estonia gets 3 out of 5 due to its 
EAC’s intensive activities and high amount of scrutinized documents, however, its score 
suffers a bit from the lack of scrutiny reserve powers and not using any innovative techniques 
to pressure the government. Latvia fares the worst in this dimension, as it suffers, basically, 
from the same problems as Estonia and also scrutinizes much less information than EAC’s 
Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts. Therefore, Latvia is given a score of 1.5 out of 5.  
Resources 
Resources dimension has two distinct aspects: human resources and time resources. From the 
human resource point of view, all three Baltic states fare considerably well by establishing 
EACs and thus devoting some administrators to exclusively deal with European policy 
matters, as separate EACs do not exist in all European countries (Winzen 2012). However, 
taking both sides of this aspect- concrete number of administrators working with European 
matters in the parliament and the subjective assessment, whether or not parliament has enough 
resources to carry out its tasks, there is a substantial variation between the Baltic states. 
Lithuania really stands out in this aspect not only among the other Baltic States, but in wider 
regional context as well. In addition to the administrators working for the EAC, each sectorial 
committee and each of the parliamentary factions have a special advisor working exclusively 
with European affairs. Therefore, in Lithuanian Seimas there are over 30 people who are 
dealing with European issues on regular basis. 
In Estonia the situation is quite worse, as the administrator corpus is much smaller. The EAC 
has six administrators working exclusively with European issues. However, since Estonia, just 
like Lithuania, is using model of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs which is similar 
to that of Finland, the EU legislative proposals to be scrutinized by the parliament are dually 
forwarded to the EAC and to one of the sectorial committees dealing with the type of issue at 
hand. This system allows to utilize the sectorial committee’s resources and expertise, because, 
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even though experts in sectorial committees do not exclusively deal with EU matters, their 
sectorial expertise allows the committee to get more in depth analysis.  
Latvia in this regard fares the weakest among the three Baltic states, as Saeima has just as 
many administrators working exclusively on the European issues as Riigikogu does, however 
the standard procedure of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs does not allow Latvian 
EAC to tap into the resources of the standing committees. Even though the Saeima Rules of 
Procedure Act allows for an opportunity to organize joint meetings between the EAC and 
other standing committees, it is utilized rarely.  
For the time management aspect the situation is more or less the same. Lithuanian EAC is in 
the best position as it receives all the information automatically through the integrated 
computer system as soon as the government does. Riigikogu is at a slightly worse position as 
receives documents forwarded by the government. However, since the government has a legal 
obligation to inform the Riigikogu as soon as possible, this link with the government is 
functioning rather well. Latvian EAC is in the relatively worst position in this aspect as well, 
as it usually gets the documents from the government just few days before the vote in the 
Council and almost never has enough time to analyze it carefully. Taken into account that 
Latvian EAC is not as actively involved in scrutinizing early phase legislation (Green books, 
White books) it really negatively affects the quality of parliamentary scrutiny as evidenced by 
the complains of the Latvian EAC members.  
Because of these reasons, Lithuania is given another 5 in Resources dimension, while Latvia 
receives a 1.5. This occurs because, Latvian EAC fares substantially weaker in terms of 
personnel as well as time management. Estonia is given a 2.5, as it occupies a somewhat 
middle position between Lithuania and Latvia. Estonian EAC has substantially more 
personnel and gets the information much earlier than its Latvian counterpart. However, some 
of its members still express dissatisfaction with the lack of resources and analytical 
capabilities asymmetry between Riigikogu and the government.  
Summary 
The analysis of the “The most important” group reveals that there is a substantial variation 
among the Baltic states in this regard. Lithuania receives almost a perfect score – 14.5/15, 
whereas Latvian result is only as high 6.5/15. Meanwhile Estonia is placed in the middle, 
receiving 9.5/15. However, it must be noted that despite this variation, in wider European 
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context the results of all three Baltic states would still be rather high, as many of the 
Mediterranean countries have very weak parliamentary scrutiny systems (Mauer & Wessels 
2001; Winzen 2012). It is mostly due to the fact that Baltic states developed their scrutiny 
models based on the experience of the Nordic Countries, which are hailed to have the 
strongest and highest quality parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs measures (Mauer & 
Wessels 2001, Persson & Wiberg 2011, EP 2012).  
“Important”	group	
Table 3: “Important” group country scores 
Country Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Dimension 
Relations with the 
government 
4.5 1.5 3.5 
Scope 5 2.5 2.5 
Information 
management  
5 2.5 2.5 
Parliamentization 4.5 2.5 4 
Total: 19 9  12.5 
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Table 4: “Important” group 
Country: Lithuania  Latvia  Estonia 
Indicator: 
Relations with government:    
Does the government have to provide 
memoranda? 
When it asks for EAC's opinion, 
yes.1 Yes7 Yes.8 
Does it submit all the documents in 
timely fashion? Yes.3;4 No.6 Yes.9 
Do government representatives 
participate in EAC’s meetings? Yes.2 Yes7 Yes.9 
What level representatives? Vice-minister.2 
Varying from minister to clerk, who 
drafted the position.7 Minister or PM 9 
How often EAC’s and government’s 
position diverge? Very often2;3;4 Very rarely6 
Rarely, mostly on minor details or 
formulations.9 
Who gets upper hand then? EAC2;3;4 Government 6 
Depends, EAC is successful in 
making small changes.9 
Does EAC feel to be in control? Yes.2 No.6 
Hard to say, mostly due to resource 
shortages.9 
Scope:    
Are CFSP/CSDP scrutinized? Yes, by FAC.1 Yes, by EAC7 Yes, by FAC8
Early phase legislation? Yes2;3;4 It can be, but no.6;7 Yes.9
OMC? Yes, though mandates are not issued.2 No.7 No.8 
COREPER meetings? Yes.10 No.7 No.9
Information management:    
Can EAC access all the information? Yes.2 Yes.7 Yes9
How does this information reach the 
EAC? 
Via integrated computer system 
LINESIS1;2 Via government5 Via government.9 
How (de facto) usually the 
documents to be scrutinized are 
selected? 
Chairs of sectorial committees and 
the speaker set up list of priorities, 
based on which EAC sets its 
agenda.10 Government requests EAC's opinion5 
Government requests EAC's 
opinion.9 
Parliamentization:    
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What portion of MP’s are members 
of the EAC? 20%1 20% 20% 
Can sectorial committees be involved 
in the scrutiny process? Yes1 Yes6 Yes8 
Are they regularly? Yes1 No.6 Yes8
Is there a legal requirement to do so? Yes1 No.5 Yes.8
Are the joint sessions with sectorial 
committees organized? Yes, rarely4 Yes, rarely6 Yes, rarely8 
Is plenary involved? Only in case of new treaties1 Only in case of new treaties.5 In case of new treaties and ESM.8 
How? Ratification1 Ratification5 
Treaties- ratification; ESM- vote in 
the plenary. 8;10 
Are members of the opposition 
adequately represented in the EAC? Yes.1 Yes.5 Yes.8 
Do they feel that they are able to 
influence the scrutiny process?  Yes.3 No.10  Yes, in minor way. 9 
 
Sources: 1- Statute of Seimas; 2- Interview with Petras Auštrevičius; Vilnius 11.07.2012; 3- Interview with Aušrinė Marija Povilionienė; Vilnius 
16.07.2012; 4- Interview with Arminas Lydeka; Vilnius 25.07.2012; 5- Rules of Procedure Act of Saeima; 6- Interview with Einars Cilinskis; via 
internet 27.02.2013; 7- Interview with Girts Ostrovskis; via internet 04.03.2013; 8- Rules of Procedure Act of Riigikogu; 9- Interview with Marko 
Mihkelson ; Tallinn 12.08.2012; 10- EP study "Democratic Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits"  
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Relations with the government 
This dimension also includes several aspects. Basically, they are all related to how 
government perceives the EAC and whether or not it holds the EAC in high esteem. First 
aspect is time- whether or not government summits required information in timely fashion and 
gives the EAC best chance to deliberate it before the vote in the Council. Second aspect is the 
amount of information the government has to provide the EAC with, when it requests its 
opinion; the third aspect- what level government representatives usually participate in EAC’s 
meetings- both of them serve as indirect indicators about the relations and power balance 
between the EAC and the government. Forth aspect is EAC ability to change and influence 
government’s position and its subjective assessment of whether or not the EAC is in control 
of these matters. Finally, the fifth aspect is whether or not the government is obliged to report 
back to the EAC about how well did it adhere to EAC’s mandate during the Council 
negotiations.  
The first aspect was already touched upon in the earlier paragraphs. Lithuanian EAC is in the 
best position, as it receives all the information automatically, Estonian EAC also fares well, 
because, even though it relies on the government to forward the information, this link is 
functioning very well. Latvian EAC is in the worst position, as the required info reaches it just 
a few days before the vote in Council (for instance in Estonia, it reaches the EAC at very least 
one week in advance). 
As for second and third aspects, Estonian EAC is in the best position, as not only the 
government has to provide EAC with the most documents and analyses before getting its 
approval, but also there is a tradition that highest level government officials take part in the 
EAC’s meetings. These indicators show that government shows healthy respect for the EAC, 
which indirectly hints that EAC is quite powerful.  
Lithuanian EAC is in a slightly worse position as usually only the vice-minister level 
government representatives participate in the committee meetings. Lithuanian EAC could 
really benefit from more direct involvement of ministers and prime minister- people who 
actually take part in the Council negotiations, as that would ensure the higher quality scrutiny. 
In Latvia the situation is even more complicated as there are no concrete traditions of what 
level government representatives take part in the EAC meetings; they can range from 
ministers to ordinary clerks, who were responsible for drafting the government’s position. Just 
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like in Lithuanian case, Latvian EAC could benefit from more direct and steady involvement 
of ministers and prime minister. 
The subsequent aspect is about how successful are the EAC’s in changing and amending 
initial government’s position. In this regard Lithuanian EAC is the most successful- EAC 
manages to get the upper hand in basically all the situations, where government’s and EAC’s 
opinions diverge. Situation in Estonia is a bit worse, as EAC’s options and analytical 
capabilities are often limited due to the lack of resources. Since Estonian EAC has smaller 
number of resources, it cannot carry out independent analysis of the legislative proposals and 
thus has to rely on the analyses done by the government, which often means that EAC ends up 
simply accepting government’s position.  
Situation in Latvia is even worse, as Latvian EAC suffers from even more severe lack of 
resources than its Estonian counterpart and therefore is forced to rely on government’s 
analysis even more. This in turn leads to very lenient committee’s stance towards the 
government and the situation where EAC does not feel to be in control of government’s 
actions. Situation is further impeded by the fact that Latvian government is the only one 
which is not legally obliged to report back to the EAC after the Council negotiations.  
Therefore Lithuania receives 4.5/5- the only aspect hindering Lithuania from receiving the 
perfect score is that usually highest ranking members of the government- ministers and PM do 
not take part in the EAC meetings. Estonia receives 3.5 because EAC members are not sure, if 
they are in control of government in this sphere and because EAC is usually successful only 
in making minor changes to the government’s position. Latvian EAC receives 1.5/5 mainly 
because Latvian government submits required documentation late, there are no traditions that 
high level government officials would take part in EAC’s meetings and EAC does not really 
feel in control of the government in this sphere.  
Scope 
This dimension has three distinct aspects: ability to scrutinize foreign policy, ability to get 
involved in the scrutiny process early and ability to scrutinize areas managed via Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). In terms of being able to scrutinize the foreign policy, all 
three Baltic states have developed scrutiny measures that allow them to do that. In Estonia 
and Lithuania this part of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is done not by EAC, but 
by Foreign Affairs Committee, whereas in Latvia it, just like the rest of EU policies is 
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responsibility of the EAC. That all three Baltic parliaments can scrutinize this policy area 
marks them as strong, as some of the Western European and Mediterranean do not have such 
powers, because there these policies are considered to be a part of country’s overall foreign 
policy, which is traditionally left as a sole responsibility of the government (Persson & 
Wiberg 2011, EP 2012).   
As for the ability to scrutinize the early phases of the legislative process (i.e. by being able to 
scrutinize EU strategies, White books, Green books and COREPER meetings) the situation in 
the Baltic states varies a lot. In Estonia the EAC has an ability to scrutinize strategies, White 
and Green books. It basically means that EAC gets involved in the EU legislative process 
from very early on and thus has more time to get acquainted with the upcoming EU 
legislation. With more time the Estonian EAC can partly compensate for its lack of resources, 
discussed in the previous section and make more thorough and in-depth analysis of these 
policies and their impacts. However, the Estonian EAC does not have an ability to scrutinize 
COREPER meetings, where draft legislation is discussed and amended before reaching the 
Council, which would enhance Estonian EAC’s abilities to get involved early on even more. 
In Latvia, the EAC has a right to scrutinize all phases of the process (strategies, White, Green 
books as well as COREPER meetings), but it utilizes these rights inconsistently. Though there 
is a tradition to prepare an EAC opinion about strategies, White and Green books, COREPER 
meetings in Latvia are de facto not scrutinized.  
It has been noted by the previous scholars of the field that areas managed via OMC are 
continuously expanding and, due to their nature (negotiation takes place and deals are made 
behind the closed doors) national parliaments can potentially become more marginalized 
(Raunio 2006). Looking at how the Baltic parliaments have responded to this challenge 
reveals that only in Lithuania parliamentary scrutiny of these sectors has become a standard 
everyday procedure. Due to the nature of these sectors (agreements and deals do not become 
binding legislation) scrutiny process is a bit looser, as Lithuanian EAC issues broader 
instructions in place of detailed binding mandates, but nonetheless government is held 
accountable in this sphere. 
Since Lithuanian EAC has right to scrutinize the full spectrum of European policy, it is given 
a score 5/5. Latvian EAC comes second in this regard, but, since it tends not to utilize its 
rights to scrutinize COREPER meetings it is given a same score as its Estonian counterpart- 
2.5/5.  
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Information management 
This dimension has two distinct aspects: ability to access the information and ability to utilize 
it. All the Baltic parliaments fare quite well in the first regard, as all the upcoming legislative 
proposals are directly forwarded to them from the European Commission and they have free 
and full access to them.  
However, this exposes another problem. Despite having functioning links with the 
Commission and access to the information, in Latvia and Estonia government is the main 
actor, bringing European matters to EACs’ attention. This is a clear signal these committees 
are suffering from information overflow- they are incapable of independently browsing 
through the information and selecting which documents must be brought before the 
committee.  
Only Lithuanian EAC demonstrates that it has enough capabilities to independently manage 
and select information. In Lithuanian case parliament is more active than the government in 
bringing matters before the EAC and selecting which documents must be scrutinized. 
Furthermore, Lithuanian information link between Commission, government and the 
parliament is the most efficient one. Therefore, in this dimension Lithuania is given a 5, 
whereas Estonia and Latvia receives slightly lower scores- 2.5’s. 
Parliamentization 
The Parliamentization dimension deals with two aspects- how well parliament is exposed to 
European matters and how well the scrutiny process fulfills the deliberation and consensus 
criteria. In all three Baltic parliaments similar share of parliamentarians is directly exposed to 
European issues, as in all three parliaments around 1/5 of MP’s belong to EACs. All three 
EACs’ rules of procedure have a requirement that committee membership would reflect the 
distribution of various factions in the parliament and all the factions would be included. It not 
only secures that opposition is represented in the EAC, but also, in some cases, creates ground 
for overrepresentation of opposition (in case of opposition consisting of the large number of 
small factions).  
However, in Estonia and Lithuania, due to the chosen scrutiny model, sectorial committee 
members are routinely exposed to European matters as well. Therefore, in these countries, 
European matters are more “parliamentarised” than in Latvia, where they are confined only to 
the EAC. However, both Lithuania and Estonia routinely, also due to the chosen model, 
52 
 
European matters were never brought before the plenary, as, for instance, is in Denmark. So 
these two parliaments were only semi-inclusive in this aspect. A good step forward is recent 
amendment of “Rules of Procedure Act” of Riigikogu, which involves the plenary in 
parliamentary scrutiny of questions related to European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
When it comes to deliberation and position-opposition relations, all parliaments fare almost 
equally. All three EACs are committed to consensus based decision making whenever it is 
possible and always prefer unanimous agreement over voting. However, it was visible from 
the earlier chapters of the empirical part that Estonian and especially Latvian EACs are less 
active and less keen on amending governments’ positions than their Lithuanian counterpart 
and that partly contributes to successful decision making through consensus. Furthermore, 
opposition members working in Lithuanian EAC were quite satisfied with their abilities to 
influence EAC’s decisions.    
In this dimension Lithuania receives 4.5/5 as present parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs model is still lacking fuller involvement of the plenary. Estonia receives the score of 
4/5 as, even though plenary there is involved to a bigger extent, it scores weak on position-
opposition relations aspect. Latvia gets a score of 2.5/5 as because in Saeima European 
matters are confined to the EAC and somewhat marginalized from the parliament. 
Summary 
Analysis of this grouping reveals somewhat similar trends as those in the “The most 
important” group. Once again there is a substantial variation among the Baltic states with 
Lithuania scoring 19/20 and Latvia less than half of that score (9/20) with Estonia hanging in 
the middle (12.5/20).  
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Instrumental	group	
Table 5: Instrumental group country scores 
Country Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Dimension 
Structuration 4 1.5 2.5 
Transparency 1 4 2.5 
European dimension 4.5 4 4 
Total: 9.5 9.5 9 
 
Structuration 
This dimension deals with how deeply entrenched the parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs is in the country’s political and legal system. Even though in all three Baltic states the 
legal basis for parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is derived from more general 
notions about parliamentary control, written in these countries’ constitutions, in none of these 
constitutions parliamentary scrutiny processes or role of EACs are not directly mentioned. 
Instead all three countries opted to lay down these procedures and EACs’ role in the Rules of 
Procedure Acts of the parliaments. Of course elevating parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs matters to the constitutional level, would be better, as it would mean more ridged and 
stronger parliamentary scrutiny, the choice to lay down the procedure in the parliaments’ 
Rules of Procedure Acts is understandable, as changing them is far easier than amending the 
constitution.  
However, the way EACs’ role and the entire parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
procedure is presented varies a lot among the Baltic states. For instance, in Lithuania the piece 
of Seimas Statute which deals exclusively with the EAC’s proceedings is very long and 
detailed (around 5000 words), whereas in Estonia the same section occupies 700 and in 
Latvia- 200 words. The difference between the regulations is even more astonishing, when 
one considers that overall length of these Rules of Procedure Acts is rather similar.  
Lithuanian Seimas opted to describe each procedure with almost excruciating detail and as a 
result, the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs procedure is not only strong and of high 
quality, but also it is made sure, that the EAC would make the best use of its powers in its 
day-to-day operations. Whereas in Latvia this legal ambiguity places the EAC on very  
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Table 6: Instrumental group 
Country: Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Indicator: 
Structuration:    
Is the role of the EAC prescribed 
by legal provisions or the 
Constitution? 
Statute of Seimas1 Rules of Procedure Act of 
Saeima5 
Rules of Procedure Act of 
Riigikogu.8 
How detail these provisions are? Very detailed1 Very undetailed5 A bit vague8
How long has EAC existed? Did 
it have any predecessors? 
Exists since 2004. Has no direct 
predecessors.10 
Since 1995.6;7 Was created in 2004. Its 
predecessor was a special 
committee which dealt with 
accession matters.10 
How was it created? Why this 
model was chosen? 
Special expert commission was 
set-up to create the scrutiny 
institution and mechanism which 
would be most suited to 
peculiarities of Lithuanian 
political system.2 
Influence of Danish advisors, who 
were present at the time in 
Saeima.6;7 
Influence of the Nordic Countries, 
esp. Finland9 
Transparency:    
How transparent is the process of 
parliamentary scrutiny? Not at all. Quite transparent More or less. 
Are the minutes or reports from 
EAC meetings accessible to the 
public? No, only the summary10 Minutes.10 Yes.10 
Are committee meetings open to 
the public? 
No, but they can be, if committee 
choses1 Usually.6;7 Usually no, but it is a possibility.9 
European dimension:    
Are EMP's members of the EAC? No.1 No.5 No.8
Are they involved in any way? 
Yes, they can participate in the 
EAC's meetings, have an advisory 
role.1 
Yes, they can participate in the 
EAC's meetings, have an advisory 
role.6;7 
Yes, they can participate in the 
EAC's meetings, have an advisory 
role.8 
55 
 
What is perception of COSAC 
within the EAC? Mixed.3;4 Mixed.3;4 Mixed.3;4 
Are there any similar gatherings 
that EAC takes part in? 
Joint meetings of EAC members 
from the three Baltic States.3;4 
Joint meetings of EAC members 
from the three Baltic States.3;4 
Joint meetings of EAC members 
from the three Baltic States.3;4 
Have the parliamentary rules of 
procedure acts have been 
amended to include parliamentary 
empowerment provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty? Why? 
Yes, Statute of Seimas already 
featured detailed provisions about 
safeguarding the subsidiarity 
clause; they were only slightly 
amended to account for new 
direct communication 
mechanisms1. No, no amendments were made5. 
Yes, the Riigikogu Rules of 
Procedure Act was amended to 
include these provisions8. 
How active are the parliaments in 
using these rights? How actively 
they have directly communicated 
with the EU institutions? 
Seimas submitted 4 inquiries to 
the EU institutions11. 
Saeima submitted 1 inquiry to the 
EU institutions11. 
Riigikogu has not submitted any 
inquiries to the EU institutions11. 
 
Sources:1- Statute of Seimas; 2- (Zilinskas 2005); 3- Interview with Aušrinė Marija Povilionienė; Vilnius 16.07.2012; 4- Interview with Arminas 
Lydeka; Vilnius 25.07.2012; 5- Rules of Procedure Act of Saeima; 6- Interview with Einars Cilinskis; via internet 27.02.2013; 7- Interview with 
Girts Ostrovskis; via internet 04.03.2013; 8- Rules of Procedure Act of Riigikogu; 9- Interview with Marko Mihkelson ; Tallinn 12.08.2012; 10- 
EP study "Democratic Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits"; 11- European Commission 2011   
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uncertain footing, as on one hand- it has a broad range of powers to scrutinize government’s 
European policy, but there are no explicit regulations (or even unwritten traditions) how EAC 
would utilize these powers to their fullest extent. Consequences of this ambiguity are 
described in more detail in the previous chapters of this part.  
The differences in the level of Structuration can be explained by looking at the origins of the 
EACs in the three countries. Latvia and Estonia used a rather simple method of adapting the 
practices of the Nordic countries to their political systems. The choice of the particular model 
there was based mostly on what kind of expertise were available at the time when EACs were 
created (Danish in Latvian case; Finnish- in Estonia). However, it is necessary to note that 
Latvia was the only country from the “Big Bang” accession group, which did not modify the 
parliamentary rules of procedure act instantly after joining the EU and continued with the 
same provisions the parliament had in place to monitor the accession process (Kietz 2006). 
Even though a bit later these rules were amended to better suit the realities of EU 
membership, it still reveals quite a lot how these matters are perceived in Saeima.  
In Lithuania, EAC was created more tediously and with more care. Seimas set up a special 
commission to amend the Statute which included members of Lithuanian EU negotiations 
delegation, lawyers and political scientists (Zilinskas 2005). As a result of this procedure, 
Lithuanian parliament emerged with much more detailed and in depth rules of procedure for 
EAC and more elaborately laid down parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process. 
Hence Lithuania receives the score of 4/5 as inclusion of parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs into the Constitution would be beneficial for its overall quality. Estonia gets 2.5/5 as 
even though it has more ridged rules than its Latvian counterpart, they are still a bit 
ambiguous. Latvia scores 1.5/5 mostly due to the ambiguity of the regulations regarding the 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs.   
Transparency 
In terms of transparency Latvian EAC fares the best, as usually committee’s meetings are 
open and accessible to public and media. Furthermore, committee usually makes the minutes 
of the meetings available on Saeima’s website.  
In Estonia situation is a bit worse, as, even though committee can choose to hold an open 
meeting, it usually decides not to. The minutes of the meeting, just like in Latvian case, are 
also available on the Riigikogu’s website. However, together with recent amendments of the 
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“Rules of Procedure Act”, which stipulated the involvement of the plenary, when matters 
related to ESM are concerned, there also began a trend to hold open committee meetings, 
which are often televised on the national TV channel. This trend is a big step forward towards 
more transparent parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process.  
In Lithuania the situation is the worst, as not only EAC is reluctant to hold open meetings, but 
also the minutes of these meetings are not available on the website, instead providing only the 
short summary of the meetings. These summaries are very undetailed (often shorter than one 
page) and do not include the positions of the government or the EAC that were presented 
during the meeting, only the final results of the discussions or votes. All the more detailed 
documents from all EACs (which do not include classified information) are technically 
available upon request from parliaments’ secretariats; however, obtaining them is a long and 
difficult procedure.    
Due to these aspects, especially due to the frequency of public meetings, Latvia receives the 
score of 4/5, the only thing that is lacking in order to achieve the maximum transparency is 
lack of more detailed reports of the activities of the EAC. Estonia receives 2.5/5 as, even 
though there is some information available about the EAC’s activities, committee meetings 
are mostly closed to the public. Lithuania receives 1/5 as not only are the EAC’s meetings 
closed, generally very limited information about committee’s activities is presented, but also 
instead of publishing full minutes, Lithuanian EAC issues just short summaries of its 
meetings.  
European dimension 
In this dimension all three Baltic parliaments receive a same score, basically - because their 
regulations and attitudes in this sphere are almost identical. All three EACs allow national 
MEPs to take part in their meetings as consultants and advisors with no voting power. This a 
very good feature, since it allows to utilize the experience and the insider knowledge of 
MEP’s without giving the ability to the actors external to the committee to directly influence 
the voting outcomes. 
All three Baltic parliaments and EACs share the similar perception of COSAC (EU wide 
conference of EAC members). They acknowledge the useful features of this institution, 
namely the information sharing and ability to learn about the most common mistakes and the 
best practices of the field. However, similarly, all EACs are not very fond of overall character 
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of these meetings, often referring to them as a waste of time (Interviews with Arminas Lydeka 
and Marko Mihkelson). 
All three parliaments also take part in narrower regional conferences of national parliaments 
out of which the most important to EAC’s is Baltic Assembly. Here EAC members can 
communicate with colleagues and exchange information in smaller and more informal circle 
than in COSAC. 
As for post-Lisbon developments, Lithuania and Estonia have amended their parliamentary 
rules of procedure, to account for the post-Lisbon changes and no such amendments were 
made in Latvia. However, given the vagueness of Latvian parliamentary rules of procedure 
regarding the scrutiny of European politics, this comes as no surprise. All three Baltic 
parliaments have been relatively not active in terms of direct communication to the European 
institutions. Lithuanian Seimas has submitted 4 such inquiries, Latvian Saeima – 1, and 
Riigikogu – 0. Due to all aforementioned aspects, Lithuania received a score of 4.5, while 
Latvia and Estonia – 4.   
Summary 
In this dimension all three Baltic States scored exceptionally well. They all received scores 
well above 50% mark and the divergence between them that was quite apparent in the 
previous two groups is not existent here. In this group Latvia and Lithuania scored the highest 
9.5/15 and Estonia was not far behind, each scoring 9/15.  
Final	country	scores	
 “The most 
important” 
score 
Standardized 
“The most 
important” 
score  
“Important” 
score 
Standardized 
“Important” 
score 
Instrumental 
score 
Standardized 
Instrumental 
score 
Final 
country 
scores 
Lithuania 14.5/15 0.9583 19/20 0.9375 9.5/15 0.5416 0.771 
Latvia 6.5/15 0.2916 9/20 0.3125 9.5/15 0.5416 0.11339 
Estonia 9.5/15 0.5416 12.5/20 0.53125 9/15 0.5 0.2821 
 
Aggregation formula 
"݄ܶ݁	݉݋ݏݐ	݅݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ݐ"	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ ൬"ܫ݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ݐ"	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁	 ∗ 2 ൅ ܫ݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ݈ܽ	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁3 ൰ 
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When the final country scores are calculated, the trend that was mentioned in the previous 
parts of this chapter becomes even more visible. There is a considerable divergence between 
the three Baltic states, Lithuania scoring the highest (~0.75), while Latvia scores are the 
lowest, dropping to ~0.11. Estonia is situated in the middle getting approximately 0.3.      
The reason why the situation is so is rather obvious. Latvia scored quite low (in comparison 
with other two Baltic states) in the first two dimensions- “The most important” and 
“Important”, which contributes the most to the final score. Low Latvian scores are mostly due 
to the fact that, even though Latvian EAC has substantial powers to scrutinize its 
government’s European policy, the EAC is rather passive in these matters and is not inclined 
to make the best possible use of its rights in practice. Furthermore, due to the procedure of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in Latvia, Latvian EAC has the least amount of 
resources to carry out its tasks (even though Estonia has the same number of administrators 
working directly with these issues, scrutiny procedure allows Estonian EAC to tap into the 
resources of standing committees on regular basis).  
By contrast in Lithuania the situation is rather different as not only Lithuanian Seimas has 
devoted highest number of resources to scrutinize European matters, but the EAC itself is 
very active and shows keen interest in making the best possible use of the powers in its 
possession.  
In Estonia the situation is rather complicated. Here as well the Riigikogu is endowed with the 
wide range of powers to scrutinize its government’s European policy and shows keen interest 
in doing so, however the situation is a bit hampered by the fact that EAC possess a rather 
small amount of resources and often simply does not enough capabilities to carry out 
independent analysis of EU legislation proposals and other information, which negatively 
affects its ability to carry out strong and high quality parliamentary scrutiny of European 
affairs.  
Placed in the context of previously conducted research on the Baltic states the findings of this 
study are quite consistent with those of  previous research. Basically, all the previous attempts 
to analyze the strength of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic states have 
established that the scrutiny measures are the strongest in Lithuania and weakest in Latvia (EP 
2012, Kietz 2006, Karlas 2011, Winzen 2012). What makes this study different is that using 
more comprehensive approach to this phenomenon and more precise measurement, it was 
able to detect smaller, but still significant differences among these three states and more 
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accurately measure the difference in the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs measures in the Baltic states. It is especially evident, when one considers the 
difference between Lithuania and Estonia. In the earlier research, the difference was often 
minute (Karlas 2011) or was not captured at all (EP 2012), whereas this study has shown that 
it is quite substantial. The more detailed account about how the model utilized in this study, 
fares against the others is given in the next chapter “Model Robustness”.  
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Chapter	4‐	Model	robustness	
 
This part of the study is dedicated to side-by-side comparison of the model employed in this 
study and other two measurement models used in this field. It outlines the main features of the 
other models as well as their main strengths and weaknesses. The last part of this chapter 
outlines, why the model used in this study is more suitable for the analysis of the strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs, at least in small n studies. 
The other two models to which the one used in this study is compared are the one developed 
by Thomas Winzen in his article “National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: 
A Cross-national and Longitudinal Comparison” (Winzen 2012) and the one developed by 
Jan Karlas in his article “Parliamentary control of EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: 
explaining the variation” (Karlas 2011). These two particular models were chosen because 
they are often used and quoted in other studies and they very clearly outline the 
conceptualization and operationalization techniques used for measurement.  
Table 7: Comparison of country results 
 This study: Winzen: Karlas: 
Lithuania 0.77/1 2.5/3 7/8 
Latvia 0.11/1 2/3 4/8 
Estonia 0.28/1 2.17/3 6/8 
Sources: Author’s work; Winzen 2012; Karlas 2011 
In his model Winzen measures the strength of parliamentary scrutiny using 3 dimensions 
which have total of 6 indicators. These dimensions are Information, Processing and 
Enforcement. Information has two indicators Access to information (Full and free access to 
all documents [2]; access to legislative proposals [1]; no free access [0]) and Government 
memoranda (special document, where government sets up its priorities to help the parliament 
to cope with information overload) (Government provides memoranda [1]; Government does 
not provide memoranda [0]). Processing has three indicators: Existence of EAC (Standing 
committee [2]; Sub-committee [1]; non-existent [0]); Involvement of sectorial committees 
(Regular [2]; irregular [1]; non-existent [0]); Existence of Scrutiny Reserve (Existing [1]; 
non-existing [0]). Enforcement has one indicator- Character of mandates (Advisory [0]; 
Allowing for justified deviation [1]; Binding [2]).  
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The data aggregation method used in this model is simple. First all the indicators are 
standardized to range from 0 to 1. Second arithmetical average is calculated from all 
indicators in one dimension to get the final dimension scores (only exception in Information 
dimension, where Memoranda carries twice the weight of Access to information) and these 
are summed up (Winzen 2012).  
Karlas uses a bit more comprehensive model, which has 4 dimensions and total of 18 
indicators. The dimensions are Access to information, Scope of scrutiny, Decentralization and 
Implications. The first three dimensions use both formal and empirical indicators to capture 
both the formal aspects of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process and how it is 
carried out in practice. Access dimension has 4 indicators: Access to legislative proposals and 
planning documents [0;1]; Has EAC analyzed substantial number of these documents [0;1]; 
Government memoranda [0;1]; Timely delivery of this memoranda [0;1]. Scope dimension 
has also 4 indicators: EAC’s ability to issue non-binding opinions on these documents [0;0.5]; 
Has EAC issued a substantial number of such opinions [0;0.5]; EAC’s ability to issue binding 
mandates [0;0.5]; Has EAC held a substantial number of meetings [0;0.5]. Decentralization 
dimension has 6 indicators: Ability for standing committees to get involved in scrutiny of 
European affairs process [0;0.5]; Are they ever involved [0;0.5]; Provisions for standing 
committees to be involved regularly [0;0.5]; Are they regularly involved [0;0.5]; Ability for 
the plenary to get involved [0;0.5]; Is it ever involved [0;0.5]. Implications dimension has 3 
indicators: Ability for EAC to issue consultative opinions [0;1]; Its ability to issue binding 
mandates [0;1]; Necessity for government to report about the course of Council negotiations 
[0.1]. 
Karlas aggregates the data as follows, based on the author-prescribed thresholds, each 
dimension receives one of the three possible rankings: W (weak), M (medium); S (strong). In 
the final aggregation step 2 points are given for S scores, 1 – for M and 0 – for W.    
The difference in the measurement results among these three studies becomes very apparent, 
when the final results are standardized and graphed next to each other. 
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Table 8: Standardized country score comparison  
 Lithuania Latvia  Estonia 
Pukelis: 0.77 0.11 0.28 
Winzen: 0,833 0,667 0,723 
Karlas 0,875 0,5 0,75 
 Sources: Author’s work, Winzen 2012; Karlas 2011 
Figure 1: Graphic comparison of country scores 
 
From this visualization we can draw a couple of important insights: 
1. All the studies capture the main tendency- parliamentary scrutiny is the strongest and 
of the highest quality in Lithuania, the weakest- in Latvia with Estonia being situated 
in the middle. 
2. Nonetheless, the final results of all three studies differ substantially. 
3. The measurement results of the model used in this study are consistently lower than 
those of the other two studies. 
4. The measurement model used in this study implies greater variance among the Baltic 
states than the other two models. 
As for the first insight, the differences among the Baltic states are easy to capture and 
therefore can be detected even when a smaller number of indicators is used. The second 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
Pukelis
Karlas
Winzen
LT EELV
64 
 
insight reflects that in this field the final results heavily depend on the measurement model 
used in the study. Continuing this line of thought, it could be argued that the more 
comprehensive measurement model is used, the better chance it has to accurately capture the 
reality.  
The final two points refer to the difference between the measurement model used in this study 
and the other two. This difference is caused by two major reasons- different conceptualization 
of the dependent variable and the different aggregation formula. First, in this study the 
dependent variable is conceptualized in an “ideal-type” way. It outlines the features of the 
perfect parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs model and measures reality in the Baltic 
states against it. Meanwhile, the other two studies take a fundamentally different approach 
summarizing the best features of the existing parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
models and measuring the reality in the European countries against that. This is the main 
reason why the measurement results in this study are consistently lower than in the other two. 
Second, this study uses different aggregation formula from the other two studies. Both 
Winzen and Karlas simply sum up the scores of each dimension to arrive to the final score. 
This basically means that they follow the assumption that all of the dimensions they are using 
are equally important. This study clearly differentiates between the three groups (“The most 
important”, “Important” and Instrumental) which is clearly reflected in the data aggregation 
formula. The fact that measurement results of this study are constantly lower is mostly 
influenced by the usage of multiplication in the data aggregation formula, which ensures 
constantly lower results. The need to use multiplication, however, directly stems from the way 
the dependent variable is conceptualized and operationalized in this study.  
Both measurement models used by Winzen and Karlas are good and robust tools for large n 
studies, when the researcher aspires to cover all EU member states (Winzen 2012) or a very 
large group of them (Karlas 2011). However, the large scope of these studies is their major 
weakness as well. When dealing with such as large number of countries, researchers have to 
rely on secondary data sources and on smaller amount of indicators. First, it inhibits them 
from strongly grasping the dynamics of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process, 
which only can really be tapped into, when researcher has access to the primary sources (EAC 
members or officials). Second, smaller number of indicators prevents researchers from 
grasping all the aspects of the process and can result in not being able to see all the important 
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details, especially when informal rules of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process 
are concerned.  
A good example of this would be existence of ad hoc scrutiny powers in Lithuania, which 
clearly sets it apart from the other two Baltic states and is a new and innovative way to avoid 
scrutiny dilemma. None of the previous studies (EP 2012, Kietz 2006, Winzen 2012, Karlas 
2011) was able to capture that, because they exist in the realm of informal and unwritten rule 
of parliamentary procedure.   
Another good example would be the role of resources in the strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny process. This study clearly demonstrates that the amount of people 
working with European matters in the parliament contributes a lot to the overall strength and 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. Having enough resources to scrutinize 
European policy can mean the difference between the parliament which is able to carry out 
the document selection and agenda setting processes independently and, thus be a strong 
player in this sphere (like in Lithuania) and a parliament where these matters are marginalized 
and the entire process is dominated by the government (like in Latvia). Since the information 
regarding the amount of resources in the parliament’s (EAC’s) possession is hard to come by 
and is available mostly from the primary sources, these indicators do not appear in nether 
Winzen’s or Karlas’ studies, which really has an effect of the overall evaluation of the 
dependent variable.  
Summing up, comparison between measurement model used in this study and the other two 
prominent models used in this field revealed that the main tendency regarding the differences 
in strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs was captured by all the 
compared studies. However, there is a substantial difference in the final country scores 
between this measurement model and the other two. These differences were caused by three 
reasons: 1. Different conceptualization of the dependent variable; 2. Different aggregation 
formulas brought by different conceptual assumptions; 3. Different scopes of the studies, 
which resulted in the other two studies capturing the less comprehensive picture of this 
phenomenon.  
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Chapter	5‐	Explaining	the	variation	
 
Chapter 2 of this study, Overview of the previous research, outlined three independent 
variables, brought forward by the previous research in this field, that could help explain the 
variation of strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs among the 
Baltic states. These are: 1. Public Euroskepticism; 2. Party Euroskepticism; 3. General power 
of the parliament (Kietz 2006; Karlas 2011).  
Other variables that have appeared in the other studies of this field such as EU accession time, 
frequency of minority governments, political structure (unitary/federal) or political culture are 
not analyzed in this paper as they cannot explain the variation among the Baltic states, 
because all three of them are very similar in these aspects.  
The first part of this chapter looks, if the variation of the dependent variable among the Baltic 
states can be sufficiently explained using either of these variables. While the second part 
proposes a new independent variable- regime type (parliamentary/semi-presidential) that can 
account for variation of strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
among the Baltic states. Finally, the third part looks into, if this independent variable can be 
applied for larger regional context.  
Public	Euroskepticism	
It is generally accepted that public Euroskepticism can (at least partly) account for variation 
of strength of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs among the EU member states (Kietz 
2006; Karlas 2011). The logic behind this is simple. Countries with higher shares of 
Euroskeptics in their populations face constant pressure from the population and the media to 
scrutinize governments’ EU policy with more transparency and vigor. Whereas countries with 
more Euroenthusiastic populations tend not to face such pressure, because the general public 
is less interested in the nuts- and- bolts of EU policy.   
However, this independent variable cannot account for the situation in the Baltic states. First, 
Baltic states have some of the strongest and highest quality parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs measures in the EU (Winzen 2012, Karlas 2011) and at the same time their 
populations tend to be rather Euroenthusiastic. The Table 9 bellow gives the data on what 
share of the population is Euroenthuziastic in the Baltic States and the EU 27 (Share of people 
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who answered positively to the statement: “All things considered, membership in the EU is a 
good thing”). 
Table 9: Share of Euroenthusiasts in the Baltic states and EU 27  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Lithuania 75% 74% 54% 52% 47% 
Latvia 48% 51% 40% 42% 38% 
Estonia 76% 78% 68% 61% 52% 
EU  54% 64% 42% 41% 31% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Furthermore, as is visible from Table 9, Lithuania and Estonia are constantly very much in 
favor of the EU and tend to show rather little Euroskepticism. At the same time they have 
relatively strong parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs measures, whereas Latvia- 
constantly the most Euroskeptic among the Baltic states, has the weakest parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs measures. Therefore, this variable is not suitable for explaining 
the variation among the Baltic states. 
Party	Euroskepticism	
As with the previous independent variable, party-based Euroskepticism is generally 
acknowledged to be a factor that can (at least partly) explain the variation of strength and 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs (Kietz 2006; Karlas 2011). Following 
the common sense it is logical that in the countries, where Euroskeptic parties are prevalent 
one can expect stronger parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs.  
However, just as it was with the previous variable, applying this to the Baltic states is rather 
problematic as none of the parliamentary parties in these states could be classified as stout 
Euroskeptics and the amount of “soft” Euroskeptics (meaning those who oppose integration 
of only certain spheres) is more of less the same as in other EU countries (Kietz 2006).  
In Estonia Center Party has played with certain Euroskeptic notions before the accession, but 
when the time came it, like the other parties backed the decision to join the EU (Kietz 2006). 
In Latvia similar process occurred with Social Democratic Alliance and the Fatherland and 
Freedom parties. Lithuanian parties has constantly shown least amount of Euroskepticism 
with minor parliamentary parties (Center party and Peasants Union) expressing soft 
Euroskepticism before the accession. (Kietz 2006).  
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As the previous section of this chapter has demonstrated, there is no significant pro/anti EU 
cleavage in the Baltic populations and therefore, it comes as no surprise that such cleavage 
does not exist among the major political parties as well. Furthermore, the Baltic parties, who 
have experimented with Euroskeptic notions before (Center party in Estonia, Peasants Union 
in Lithuania) are rather populist and they constantly change and adapt their official rhetoric to 
suit the needs of the majority of the populations. Therefore, Euroskepticism of these parties 
was not deep or ideological, but rather was used as an instrument to boost their popularity. 
Due to the aforementioned aspects, this independent variable cannot be used to explain the 
variation of the strength and scrutiny of European politics among the Baltic states.    
General	power	of	the	parliament	
Just like with two previous variables the logic behind this one is simple. If parliament’s 
general power is greater, it stands to reason that the same could be extended to strength and 
quality of parliamentary control of European affairs (Raunio 2005; Kietz 2006; Karlas 2011). 
Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the MA thesis, it is impossible to carry out a complete 
conceptualization and operationalization of this variable; rather this study borrows results 
from the study  “Parliamentary control of EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: 
explaining the variation” by Jan Karlas (Karlas 2011). 
Karlas measures general power of the parliament using his own model which is the 
combination of three existing indexes: (1) Woldendorp’s index of executive– legislative 
balance (measuring the control over the formation and dismissal of the government and the 
president’s executive power) (Woldendorp et al. 2000); (2) indicators measuring legislative 
activity (Kraatz and Steinsdorff 2002); and (3) Döring’s index of participation rights (i.e., the 
rights of individual MPs to participate in legislative process and in the control of the 
government policy) (Döring 1994). He recodes all the indexes to have trichotomous scores (1, 
2 or 3) and then sums them up to have one final index which ranges from 3 to 9 (Karlas 
2011).  
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Table 10: Dependent variable country scores and general power of the parliament 
 Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Dependent variable 
scores 
0.77 0.11 0.28 
Karlas’ index of 
parliamentary power 
8 3 6 
Sources: Author’s work, Karlas 2011 
Table 10 clearly shows that this variable varies in the same manner as the dependent variable. 
Therefore, it can be used to explain the variation of strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs among the Baltic states. Furthermore, in his study, Karlas has 
demonstrated that this variable scores has the highest correlation with the dependent variable 
scores (Spearman’s correlation 0.619) (Karlas 2011) and, therefore, this independent variable 
best explains the dependent variable variation among all CEE countries as well.  
Semi‐presidentialism	
Despite the abovementioned explanatory power of the General power of the parliament, the 
author of this study does not think - that this variable is best suited to explain the variation of 
among the Baltic states or in wider regional context. The reason for that is that from the 
conceptual point of view, this argument sounds a bit tautological. Stating that strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is conditioned by overall strength of parliamentary 
scrutiny in a country does not reveal much. 
The problem is that this variable tells us nothing of the root causes of strength or weakness of 
parliamentary scrutiny (of any sphere). Therefore, the author of this paper suggests that this 
variable is best considered to be not the independent variable, but the intervening one.  
Since this study, due to its qualitative character, is also interested in various path-
dependencies that might have some influence on the strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs, it also included several questions about the origins of the 
scrutinizing bodies in the three Baltic states and the reasons, why and how the particular 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs model was established in each country.  
The research revealed that one of the reasons why Lithuania developed such a strong and 
captious parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs model was its regime type- semi-
presidentalism. Basically, the need to develop parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
70 
 
procedures that would allow parliament to closely monitor and control the actions of the 
executive in the EU level arose from the duality of the Lithuanian executive (the government 
and the president) and the need to control and scrutinize the president’s actions.  
The issue is that the president in Lithuania is directly elected by the people and, thus, not 
accountable to the parliament. However, Lithuanian Constitutional Court has ruled that, 
despite everything, „Lithuania is a parliamentary system with certain semi-presidential 
features“(Lithuanian Constitutional Court Decision of 10 January 1998). This ruling gave 
Lithuanian parliament, Seimas, the right to exercise the parliamentary scrutiny of President’s 
actions.  
In parliamentary regimes there is a considerable overlap between parliamentary majority and 
the government and, therefore, big part of parliamentary scrutiny can be (and often is) carried 
out via informal channels inside the ruling coalition (or a party) (Auel 2005; Auel 2007; Kietz 
2007). In case of Lithuania, and basically all semi-presidentialist regimes, such opportunity 
does not exist when the president is concerned and, therefore, parliament has established 
powerful formal institutions to carry out this task. In other words, semi-presidential regime 
type creates the conditions for strong and high quality parliamentary scrutiny to take place. 
This is especially true in the sphere of European affairs, where these presidents have the right 
to represent their countries in the Council negotiations. 
By contrast in Latvia the president is elected by the parliament and is directly accountable to 
it. Furthermore, the president has substantially smaller amount of power in all spheres of 
political life including the EU affairs. Because of that - ministers and prime minister mostly 
attend the Council negotiations and, due to aforementioned overlap between parliamentary 
majority and the government, parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is mostly confined to 
informal channels inside the ruling coalition, whereas formal institutions play a much weaker 
role.  
Meanwhile Estonia is a truly interesting case. It is a purely parliamentary system - just like 
Latvia. However, the inquiry about the origins of the scrutinizing body in Estonia has 
revealed that the shape and the model of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs are 
largely borrowed from Finland with which Estonia shares high linguistic and cultural 
proximity (Interview with M. Mikhelson). The issue is that Finland is (or at least used to be, 
when the practice transfer occurred) a semi-presidentialist state. Just like in Lithuania, in 
Finland semi-presidentialism conditioned the establishment of strong parliamentary scrutiny 
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of European affairs. Therefore, because Estonia transferred and adapted parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs procedure from semi-presidentialist country to its parliamentary 
system, Estonia today has a much stronger and higher quality parliamentary scrutiny of 
European affairs procedures than Latvia.  
Semi‐presidentialism‐	explaining	the	variation	in	broader	region	
This part of the chapter looks into, if semi-presidentalism can be used to explain the variation 
of strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs among the countries 
which joined the EU during the last three EU enlargements. This particular set of countries 
have been chosen because, as been mentioned before, EU accession time has been proven to 
have an impact on overall strength of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs (EP 2012), 
so it is only sensible to take countries that joined the EU not too far apart. Furthermore, 
countries belonging to this group nicely split half-and-half between semi-presidential and 
parliamentary countries. To achieve this, this section borrows the dependent variable scores 
from the article “National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-
national and Longitudinal Comparison” (Winzen 2012). Despite the critique expressed 
towards this measurement model in the previous chapter, it is still the best and the most 
comprehensive source of such data in relation to these countries. It is important to note, that, 
due to aforementioned reasons, Estonia is excluded from this country group. The list of semi-
presidentialist countries in the region used here is taken from the study “Politics of Semi- 
Presidentialism” by Robert Elgie (Elgie 1999).  
Table 11: Semi-Presidentialism and strength of parliamentary scrutiny 
Semi-
presidental 
Winzen's 
DV 
scores 
Parliamentary Winzen's 
DV 
scores  
Finland 2,5 Cyprus 0,33 
Lithuania 2,5 Malta 1,5 
Bulgaria 2 Czech Rep. 1,83 
Poland 2 Hungary 2 
Romania 2,33 Sweden 1,83 
Slovenia 2 Latvia 2 
    Slovakia 2,5 
Average:  2,22   1,71 
Sources: Winzen 2012; Elgie 1999 
It is easy to spot that there is a substantial difference between average dependent variable 
values in these two groups. Due to small number of cases and relatively variant dependent 
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variable scores, it is rather difficult to apply any scientific statistical techniques to quickly 
answer whether or not regime type has an impact on overall strength and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. However, using Stuart T test to check, if there is a 
statistically significant difference between these two means, reveals that the means differ 
significantly at 80% confidence level. Either way, more in-depth and through analysis of this 
issue is needed, which, hopefully will be addressed by future studies.
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Conclusions	
 
This thesis had two major aims: 1. To measure the strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs in the Baltic states. 2. To account for and explain the variation of 
this phenomenon among them. 
To achieve the first aim, this study has built a new and comprehensive model to measure the 
dependent variable. That included new conceptualization of the dependent variable, derived 
from the principal-agent theory, which used “ideal-type” approach to the conceptualization 
process. Furthermore, it also included new operationalization of the dependent variable, more 
suitable for small-n studies, such as this one. What really sets the operationalization of the 
dependent variable, used in this study, from others, existing in the field, is that this study 
employed two to three times more indicators to measure the dependent variable. This was 
done to make sure that even the smallest details and nuances, which might influence the final 
outcome, would be captured by this measurement model.  
The measurement model was created by synthesizing the virtues of the earlier major studies 
and approaches and by enhancing them with new sets of indicators aimed at capturing the role 
of informal practices in the national parliaments and various path-dependencies, associated 
with the process of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. In addition, it is important to 
note that some of the theoretical notions that existed in the field, but, to author’s best 
knowledge, were not ever operationalized (i.e. the role of parliamentary opposition in this 
process) were included in this study as well. 
Furthermore, this study used a new way to aggregate the collected data into one final score. In 
contrast to earlier studies, that used simple addition to calculate the final score, this study used 
multiplication-based aggregation formula, which better reflects the fact that various aspects, 
influencing the final outcome, do not carry an equal weight and thus cannot be treated as such 
in the data aggregation formula.  
The measurement has shown that there is a substantial variance among the Baltic states in 
strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. Lithuania has scored the 
highest- 0.77/1; Latvia- relatively low- 0.11/1 and Estonia is in the middle having a score of 
0.28/1. It is important to note, that these measurement results are relatively lower than those 
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of the other studies. This was brought by above mentioned multiplication-based data 
aggregation formula, which often tends to bring the scores down. 
This study has demonstrated that, even though the Baltic states differ very little in terms of 
formal powers their parliaments have to scrutinize their governments’ European policy, there 
is a substantial variation among the Baltic parliaments on terms how willing they are to use 
the powers in their possession and the resources they have to carry out the parliamentary 
scrutiny in this sphere. This all comes down to a situation, where Baltic parliaments occupy 
very different roles in the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs process. Lithuanian 
Seimas is a truly powerful and independent actor which has ability and resources to 
independently carry-out analysis of the European policy documents, has an ability to set its 
own priorities and agenda. Whereas Latvian Saeima is a weaker party in government-
parliament relations, even though it has substantial formal powers, it has little willingness to 
use them and little amount of resources to carry out these tasks. In other words, it does not 
feel to be in control of government’s European policy. In Estonia the situation is a mix of 
these two. The Riigikogu has both substantial formal powers and great willingness to use 
them, though lack of resources to carry out these tasks often gets in the way of strong and 
high-quality parliamentary scrutiny of European policy.  
To achieve the second aim, this study has tested three independent variables, that were used in 
the previous studies to explain the variation in the strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs among the EU member states- public Euroskepticism, party 
Euroskepticism and general power of the parliaments. It has shown that in the context of the 
Baltic states the first two variables cannot be used to account for variation of the dependent 
variable, as all three Baltic states are very similar in these aspects. Only the third independent 
variable-general power of the parliament can account for variation in the Baltic context. 
However, this study considers this line of reasoning (the parliament’s strength in the sphere of 
parliamentary scrutiny of European policy depends on parliament’s overall strength) to be 
rather tautological and suggests that this variable is better to be considered as the intervening 
and not the independent variable. Instead, this study suggests a new independent variable- 
regime type (parliamentary or semi-presidential). 
This study demonstrates that regime type can influence the general power of the parliament 
and, in turn, the strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European policy. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that regime type has had profound influence on how the 
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parliamentary scrutiny of European policy procedures were established in each of the Baltic 
states as well as on how strong and of high quality they are. In Lithuania, the existence of 
popularly elected president, who often takes part in the Council negotiations, stimulated the 
need to establish a strong and high quality parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs 
procedure, which would also allow to scrutinize the actions of the president in this sphere. In 
Latvia, these conditions are absent and, as a result, a big part of scrutiny of European affairs is 
carried out within the ruling party or coalition via informal channels, which result in relatively 
weaker formal parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. In Estonia the situation is unique, 
because, even though it has same regime type as Latvia, it adopted many parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs procedures from neighboring Finland, which, at least at the time, 
was semi-presidential. Therefore, Estonia has stronger and higher quality parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs than Latvia, due to the influence of Finland, but weaker than 
Lithuania due to its regime type.  
Finally, this study has shown that there is a substantial difference between the semi-
presidential and parliamentary countries that joined the EU during the last three enlargements 
in terms of their strength and quality of parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs. However, 
this demonstration is too small and undetailed to be conclusive. Therefore, the issue of 
whether or not regime type has an influence on the strength and quality of parliamentary 
scrutiny of European affairs is an interesting and worth-pursuing topic for future research.    
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